Human behavior in one-shot perfect information games deviates from game-theoretic rationality
Human decision-making in strategic settings regularly diverges from the assumptions of classical game-theoretic rationality, driven by bounded rationality, social norms, and cognitive limitations.
The retrieved literature consistently supports the claim that human behavior deviates from game-theoretic rationality, citing bounded rationality, normative behaviors, and cognitive constraints. No papers refute the claim.
Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt. (Un)Bounded Rationality in Decision Making and Game Theory – Back to Square One?. 2010. https://doi.org/10.3390/g1010053
Paper 1 discusses how bounded rationality challenges standard game-theoretic premises where symmetric rationality is assumed.
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Yan M, Li Z, Li Y, Boyd R, Mathew S. A norm about harvest division is maintained by a desire to follow tradition, not by social policing.. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2413214122
Paper 6 demonstrates that human behavior in harvest-division games deviates from pure payoff maximization and game-theoretic rationality.
Zonca J, Del Mauro L, Rustichini A, Polonio L, Reverberi C. Learning in Interactive Decision-Making: The Interplay Between Cognitive Abilities and the Strategic Environment.. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1162/opmi_a_00186
Paper 10 highlights systematic departures from theoretically optimal behavior in strategic interactive decision-making.
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