First-price sealed-bid auctions yield higher revenue than second-price auctions under certain conditions
Economic theory and auction literature support that under specific conditions, such as bidder risk aversion, first-price sealed-bid auctions can yield higher expected revenues than second-price auctions.
Judged against reference works: claims of this kind are settled by reference works, not journal abstracts.
Wikipedia: Auction theory. Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Auction_theory
Reference article covering this claim directly
See more details
link.springer.com: Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance | Review of Economic Design | Springer Nature Link. link.springer.com. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10058-017-0202-z
Discusses expected revenue comparisons between first-price and second-price auctions under specific conditions.
The paper trail · every fact has a biography
Challenge the receipt
Citation formatting by citeproc-js (Frank Bennett) and the Citation Style Language project. Source and licenses.
Terms · Privacy · How verdicts work · Dispute this receipt