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the claim
Reference, sense, connotation, denotation, intension, and extension are mutually distinct semantic terms.
the verdict
REFUTED
the evidence says no
refutedsupported
the weight of evidence
1 source for · 2 against
AS REPORTEDno primary record reached; this is what the reporting says

Semantic literature typically treats reference and denotation as equivalent, and sense and connotation as equivalent to intension, meaning these terms are not all mutually distinct.

Evidence for · 1
Wikipedia: Reference
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Reference article covering this claim directly
Evidence against · 2
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones
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Treats intension and connotation, as well as extension and denotation, as interchangeable pairs rather than distinct terms.
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More against · 1
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Intensional Logic
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Explains that sense and reference correspond to intension and extension, meaning they are not mutually distinct.
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first checked04 Aug 2026
judged → REFUTED · 2204 Aug 2026
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