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the claim

Reason is a broader philosophical concept than logic

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SUPPORTED
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3 sources for · 0 against

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Is it true that reason is a broader philosophical concept than logic?

Yes. Reason is widely treated in philosophical traditions as a broader faculty encompassing logic alongside other cognitive domains, values, and principles of rationality.

Verdict: SUPPORTED · 3 sources for, 0 against · Last checked

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Judged against reference works: claims of this kind are settled by reference works, not journal abstracts.

Evidence for · 3
Reference article covering this claim directly
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Wikipedia: Reason. (n.d.). Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reason

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More for · 2
2024
Notes that action theory draws on the philosophy and logic of human action, linking reason/philosophy broadly.
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Cordoba, M. O. (2024). Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce: On the philosophy and logic of human action: A Neo-Austrian contribution to the methodology of the social sciences. Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce. https://doi.org/10.59203/zfn.76.681

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2024
Draws on the philosophy and logic of human action, treating them as part of broader philosophical action theory.
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OpenAIRE: On the philosophy and logic of human action: A Neo-Austrian contribution to the methodology of the social sciences. (2024). OpenAIRE. https://doi.org/10.59203/zfn.76.681

2013
Critiques the deification of logic and reason as part of a broader cognitive totality including intuition and feeling.
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OpenAIRE: Hesychast roots of anthropomystical ideas in ukrainian philosophical tradition. (2013). OpenAIRE. https://explore.openaire.eu/

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2015
Discusses Perelman's work as an enlargement of the concept of reason to include domains beyond formal logic, such as the probable and preferred.
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OpenAIRE: Argumentação e lógica em Chaïm Perelman. (2015). OpenAIRE. https://explore.openaire.eu/

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first checked05 Aug 2026
judged → SUPPORTED · 7505 Aug 2026
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