Non-physicalist and non-materialist models of human cognition exist in philosophy of mind
Is it true that Non-physicalist and non-materialist models of human cognition exist in philosophy of mind?
The existence of non-physicalist and non-materialist models of human cognition in the philosophy of mind is a matter of common knowledge and standard philosophical categorization, requiring no empirical citation.
Verdict: COMMON KNOWLEDGE · 0 sources for, 0 against · Last checked
The claim asserts that non-physicalist and non-materialist models of human cognition exist within philosophy of mind. This is a matter of standard academic definition and historical taxonomy (e.g., dualism, idealism, mental monism, and various non-reductionist frameworks are foundational subjects in philosophy of mind). Under STEP 0, claims that are trivially true by definition or standard disciplinary taxonomy are classified as COMMON_KNOWLEDGE, meaning no citation is needed and no evidence weighing is required.
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The claim asserts that non-physicalist and non-materialist models of human cognition exist within philosophy of mind. This is a matter of standard academic definition and historical taxonomy (e.g., dualism, idealism, mental monism, and various non-reductionist frameworks are foundational subjects in philosophy of mind). Under STEP 0, claims that are trivially true by definition or standard disciplinary taxonomy are classified as COMMON_KNOWLEDGE, meaning no citation is needed and no evidence weighing is required.
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