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the claim

Idealism and physicalism make distinct ontological claims about the fundamental substance of reality

the verdict
SUPPORTED
the evidence backs this
Recorded sources
5 sources for · 0 against

Counts group repeated records of the same source within each side. They do not measure evidence strength or source independence.

AS REPORTEDno primary record reached; this is what the reporting says

Is it true that idealism and physicalism make distinct ontological claims about the fundamental substance of reality?

Yes. Idealism and physicalism make opposing ontological claims regarding whether reality is fundamentally mental or physical.

Verdict: SUPPORTED · 5 sources for, 0 against · Last checked

How claims like this are judged

Judged against reference works: claims of this kind are settled by reference works, not journal abstracts.

Evidence for · 5
Wikipedia: Idealism
Reference article covering this claim directly
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Wikipedia: Idealism. (n.d.). Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism

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More for · 4
Wikipedia: Physicalism
Reference article covering this claim directly
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Wikipedia: Physicalism. (n.d.). Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Substance
It discusses substance as fundamental entities in metaphysics.
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Substance. (n.d.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Physicalism
It addresses physicalism's claims regarding fundamental physical features.
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Physicalism. (n.d.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Idealism
It highlights idealism's ontological point about reality.
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Idealism. (n.d.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/

Receipt History
first checked04 Aug 2026
judged → SUPPORTED · 7504 Aug 2026
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