Gettier problems can be resolved by assuming JTB as the formal definition of truth
Is it true that Gettier problems can be resolved by assuming JTB as the formal definition of truth?
No. Gettier problems cannot be resolved by assuming the traditional Justified True Belief (JTB) account of truth; rather, Gettier's counterexamples famously demonstrated that JTB is inadequate because it allows justified true beliefs to be true merely by epistemic luck.
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The retrieved literature universally agrees that Gettier problems expose a fundamental flaw in the Justified True Belief (JTB) account, showing that JTB is insufficient for knowledge rather than serving as a resolution. Papers [1], [2], and [6] directly refute the notion that JTB solves Gettier problems, explaining instead that Gettier's counterexamples broke the classical JTB paradigm and necessitated additional conditions (or alternative frameworks) to address epistemic luck. No papers support the claim.
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Foley, R. (2012). Post-Gettier Accounts of Knowledge. doi.org. https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691154725.003.0002
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Ramadlan, Y. Z. S. & Oktafiani, T. U. (2026). Kritik Edmund Gettier terhadap Paradigma Epistemologi Justified True Belief (JTB). doi.org. https://doi.org/10.33503/paradigma.v32i1.2516
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Zagzebski, L. T. (2020). The Inescapability of Gettier Problems. doi.org. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197529171.003.0019
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