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the claim
Market efficiency fails in the presence of indivisible bids.
the verdict
SUPPORTED
the evidence backs this
refutedsupported
the weight of evidence
3 sources for · 0 against

Market efficiency can be compromised by indivisible bids and non-convexities, which introduce challenges for market clearing and long-term equilibrium.

Evidence for · 3
Market‐Based Allocation with Indivisible Bids
2007 · cited by 11
Paper [0] demonstrates that indivisibility constraints in bidding create distinct trade-offs in communication and allocation efficiency, showing how market-based allocations are influenced by these constraints.
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The analysis

The claim states that market efficiency fails in the presence of indivisible bids. Papers [0], [8], and [9] directly discuss how indivisibilities, non-convexities, and discrete offers in auctions and investments create allocation inefficiencies and equilibrium failures. No papers contradict this relationship. Therefore, the verdict is SUPPORTED.

More for · 2
Indivisibilities in investment and the role of a capacity market.
2024 · cited by 0
Paper [8] analyzes non-convexities and indivisibilities in investment and market clearing, highlighting the absence of equilibrium and issues arising from lumpiness in capacity markets.
Indivisibilities in Investment and the Role of a Capacity Market
2023 · cited by 0
Paper [9] examines the same issues regarding indivisibility in investment decisions and long-term market equilibria, addressing how discrete offers cause structural failures in market clearance.
The paper trail · every fact has a biography
first checked04 Aug 2026
judged → SUPPORTED · 8204 Aug 2026
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