Majority rule voting is intransitive in certain preference configurations
the verdict
SUPPORTED
the evidence backs this
confidence 75/100
Evidence establishes that under specific preference configurations (known as the Condorcet paradox), majority rule voting can yield cyclic and thus intransitive collective preferences.
Evidence for · 3
en.wikipedia.org: Condorcet paradox
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Condorcet's paradox shows majority rule can produce cyclic, intransitive collective preferences like rock-paper-scissors.
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More for · 2
link.springer.com: From Condorcet’s paradox to Arrow: yet another simple proof of the impossibility theorem | Social Choice and Welfare | Springer Nature Link
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Shows specific preference profiles lead to contradictions under majority-based pairwise comparison.
doi.org: Implicit Intransitivity Under Majority Rule with Mixed Motions
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Discusses situations that become intransitive under the majority voting rule.