Deposit guarantees increase moral hazard and the likelihood of bank runs
the verdict
SUPPORTED
the evidence backs this
confidence 82/100
Deposit guarantees and insurance schemes protect depositors against losses but can encourage risk-taking behavior, or moral hazard, which subsequently increases vulnerability to bank runs and financial instability.
Evidence for · 3
The COVID-19 Run on Medical Resources in Wuhan China: Causes, Consequences and Lessons.
2021 · cited by 12
Applies bank run theory and highlights how depositor moral hazard and inadequate insurance schemes drive runs on resources.
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More for · 2
Liquidity Provision vs. Deposit Insurance: Preventing Bank Panics Without Moral Hazard
2001 · cited by 4
Demonstrates through a formal model that deposit insurance policies prevent certain runs but inherently create moral hazard problems.
Cushion hypothesis and credit risk: Islamic versus conventional banks from the MENA region.
2024 · cited by 0
Notes that conventional banks commit moral hazards under the shadow of sovereign and deposit insurance guarantees due to a perceived safety net.