Infinitely repeated games accurately model real-world economic interactions
the verdict
CONTESTED
the evidence cuts both ways
confidence 32/100
While traditional laboratory experiments show that infinitely repeated games can successfully predict cooperative behaviors under certain controlled conditions, modern economic and game-theoretic research demonstrates that real-world interactions are frequently complicated by partner choices, institutional frameworks, and concurrent games, making standard infinitely repeated game models incomplete.
The evidence we hold leans evenly split
How this was weighed
official record 3x · fact-check 2x · hedged 1x · crowd & reference 1x
Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evi · peer-reviewed · supports · weight 2 · 2005
Cooperation Under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evi · peer-reviewed · supports · weight 1.05 · 2002
Optimization Incentives and Cooperation in Infinitely Repeat · peer-reviewed · supports · weight 1 · 2026
The social leverage effect: Institutions transform weak repu · peer-reviewed · refutes · weight 1.05 · 2024
Repeated games with partner choice. · peer-reviewed · refutes · weight 1.05 · 2025
Dynamics of cooperation in concurrent games. · peer-reviewed · refutes · weight 1.05 · 2025
Interaction Frequency and Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated · peer-reviewed · refutes · weight 1 · 2026
Evidence for · 3
Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games
2005 · cited by 456
Paper [0] provides experimental evidence that the shadow of the future in infinitely repeated games successfully reduces opportunistic behavior in line with theoretical predictions.
Evidence against · 4
The social leverage effect: Institutions transform weak reputation effects into strong incentives for cooperation.
2024 · cited by 6
Paper [1] demonstrates that real-world economic cooperation often requires institutional structures rather than mere reputation effects modeled in basic repeated games.
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More for · 2
Cooperation Under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games
2002 · cited by 3
Paper [2] finds strong empirical support that continuation probabilities in infinitely repeated games lead to cooperation levels that match theoretical equilibrium outcomes.
Optimization Incentives and Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games
2026 · cited by 0
Paper [10] uses laboratory data to show that optimization incentives in infinitely repeated games accurately capture behavioral cooperation under certain dilemma severities.
More against · 3
Repeated games with partner choice.
2025 · cited by 1
Paper [4] shows that standard repeated game models fail to capture human interaction because allowing partner choice alters cooperation dynamics significantly.
Dynamics of cooperation in concurrent games.
2025 · cited by 1
Paper [5] finds that concurrent multi-game interactions create spillover effects that complicate simple repeated game assumptions.
Interaction Frequency and Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games
2026 · cited by 0
Paper [11] presents experimental findings where higher interaction frequency in repeated market settings fails to increase collusion as standard infinitely repeated game models predict.