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Collusion between firms leads to higher prices

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SUPPORTED
the evidence backs this
Recorded sources
7 sources for · 1 against

Counts group repeated records of the same source within each side. They do not measure evidence strength or source independence.

Is it true that Collusion between firms leads to higher prices?

Yes. Multiple sources state that colluding firms fix or raise prices above competitive levels, with one paper explicitly concluding explicit collusion leads to higher prices than tacit collusion. A case study notes some parallel price increases stem from competition rather than collusion.

Verdict: SUPPORTED · 7 sources for, 1 against · Last checked

The private library was unavailable for some searches in this check. Missing library results are not evidence against the claim.

Evidence for · 7
Collusion
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Collusion. (n.d.). en.wikipedia.org. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collusion

Evidence against · 1
Is it Collusion or Competition behind Price Parallelism? (Chapter 12) - Cartels Diagnosed Logo for Cambridge Core from Cambridge University Press. Click to return to homepage. Logo for Cambridge Core from Cambridge University Press. Click to return to homepage.
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Is it Collusion or Competition behind Price Parallelism? (Chapter 12) - Cartels Diagnosed Logo for Cambridge Core from Cambridge University Press. Click to return to homepage. Logo for Cambridge Core from Cambridge University Press. Click to return to homepage.. (n.d.). cambridge.org. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cartels-diagnosed/is-it-collusion-or-competition-behind-price-parallelism/481B9E98C68D4A17E9F86B4B29E159A7

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More for · 6
Collusion and number of firms
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Collusion and number of firms. (n.d.). economics.stackexchange.com. https://economics.stackexchange.com/questions/18

The Dumping Argument and Trusts
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The Dumping Argument and Trusts. (n.d.). economics.stackexchange.com. https://economics.stackexchange.com/questions/39131

Why don't suppliers increase price after a positive demand shock?
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Why don't suppliers increase price after a positive demand shock?. (n.d.). economics.stackexchange.com. https://economics.stackexchange.com/questions/37734

On Tacit versus Explicit Collusion
2014
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On Tacit versus Explicit Collusion. (2014). doi.org. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2518707

Excess Capacity and Pricing in Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets: Experimental Evidence
2013
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Excess Capacity and Pricing in Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets: Experimental Evidence. (2013). doi.org. https://doi.org/10.1628/093245613x666306

Market segmentation and collusive behavior
2006
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Market segmentation and collusive behavior. (2006). doi.org. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.05.004

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