This paper evaluates studies that have used the Defining Issues Test for validating Kohlberg's theory of moral stage development. Although this test was introduced to overcome inadequacies with Kohlberg's procedure, it too encounters serious methodological and conceptual difficulties. Its limitations include truncation of the stages and age range assessed. The validation studies, both cross-sectional and longitudinal, have used a correlational design and confounded age with other variables. Threats to internal and external validity obviate support claimed for Kohlberg; moral reasoning thus measured seems a function of education, IQ, direct moral training, and cultural values rather than maturation. Nor is the stage model upheld by longitudinal data, which fail to reveal sequential stepwise change and belie occasional regression. Attempted redefinition of the stage concept to salvage these data has not rescued Kohlberg's proposal, which remains to be validated empirically.

Previous studies showed relations between results of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and utilitarian moral reasoning, but, there is not clear evidence does CRT results correlate with moral reasoning when it is measured by hypothetic scenarios (i.e. when there are no intuitive answers). The aim of this study was to test do people who prefer reflexive or reflective types of thinking (measured by CRT test) differ in moral reasoning when it` s assessed by hypothetic scenarios. We assumed that people who prefer the reflexive way of thinking would have a higher result on Test of moral reasoning because this sort of thinking is related to preferences for higher engagement in complex cognitive tasks (and which corresponds to arguments related to Kohlberg´s higher stages of moral development). In contrary, reflective types generally prefer a heuristic way of thinking so we assumed that persons who prefer this type of thinking would have lower results on Test of moral reasoning. In this study participated 442 subjects (279 males, 163 females ; age range 19 - 76 (M=34.52)). The task of subjects was to fill out online English versions of Moral reasoning test (Proroković, 2016) and expanded version of Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) (Toplak, West, Stanovich, 2014). Two tests were applied through PsyToolkit software which collected the subject`s answer and time needed to answer (response time). Based on CRT result two groups of participants are formed: reflexive type (n=211 ; 5 of 7 co

To review empirical evidence on character development among youth with chronic illnesses.A systematic literature review was conducted using PubMed and PSYCHINFO from inception until November 2013 to find quantitative studies that measured character strengths among youth with chronic illnesses. Inclusion criteria were limited to English language studies examining constructs of character development among adolescents or young adults aged 13-24 years with a childhood-onset chronic medical condition. A librarian at Duke University Medical Center Library assisted with the development of the mesh search term. Two researchers independently reviewed relevant titles (n = 549), then abstracts (n = 45), and finally manuscripts (n = 3).There is a lack of empirical research on character development and childhood-onset chronic medical conditions. Three studies were identified that used different measures of character based on moral themes. One study examined moral reasoning among deaf adolescents using Kohlberg's Moral Judgement Instrument; another, investigated moral values of adolescent cancer survivors with the Values In Action Classification of Strengths. A third study evaluated moral behavior among young adult survivors of burn injury utilizing the Tennessee Self-Concept, 2(nd) edition. The studies observed that youth with chronic conditions reasoned at less advanced stages and had a lower moral self-concept compared to referent populations, but that they did differ on character virtu

In 1988, P. Scott Richard's dissertation research at the University of Minnesota asserted that the Defining Issues Test (DIT), a widely accepted paper-and-pencil test of moral reasoning, exhibited item bias against religiously orthodox persons. Since 1988 (when Richard's data were reported), new methods of differential-item functioning (DIF) have developed, a new DIT has emerged (the DIT-2), as well as a Neo-Kohlbergian framework based upon moral schemas derived from Kohlberg's Piagetian-like six stages. With new methods, new tests, and unanswered questions, this study's results imply: (1) that DIT-2 items exhibit differential item functioning for religiously orthodox persons in statistically significant but not as practically significant ways as Richards' earlier findings, (2) that religious orthodoxy does influence macromoral reasoning as measured by the DIT-2, (3) that the maintaining norms schema is insufficient to explain the variables that contribute to why religiously orthodox persons score the way they do. This study implies that the maintaining norms schema may be misnamed because it appears to be measuring a different construct than maintaining norms macromoral reasoning.