The literatures on bounded and ecological rationality are built on adaptationism-and its associated modular, cognitivist and computational paradigm-that does not address or explain the evolutionary origins of rationality. We argue that the adaptive mechanisms of evolution are not sufficient for explaining human rationality, and we posit that human rationality presents exaptive origins, where exaptations are traits evolved for other functions or no function at all, and later co-opted for new uses. We propose an embodied reconceptualization of rationality-embodied rationality-based on the reuse of the perception-action system, where many neural processes involved in the control of the sensory-motor system, salient in ancestral environments have been later co-opted to create-by tinkering-high-level reasoning processes, employed in civilized niches. In its general definition, also known under the general label of Universal Darwinism, evolution is instantiated by the processes of variation, selection and retention—processes that account for the diversity that composes natural and cultural systems (cf. Campbell, 1960 ; Lewontin, 1970 ; Dawkins, 1983 ; Hodgson, 2005 ). The program of research on bounded rationality, started by Herbert A. Simon, owes much to evolutionary frameworks, as it is argued that human behaviors must be studied with respect to specific task environments. Interestingly, ecological rationality avoids both trivial adaptive explanation (“just-so stories”) and the necessity of accurate theorizing on the nature of origins: “It thus would be a weak argument […] to find a heuristic that humans use, then search for some environment in which that heuristic works well, and then claim on this basis alone that the heuristic is an adaptation to that environment. The heuristic may work well in that environment, but that need not be the reason why it evolved or even why it has survived” ( Hutchinson and Gigerenzer, 2005 , p. 109; see also Navarrete and Santamaría, 2011 ). Gaze heuristics, in this regard, is quite representative, as—we suppose—it first glimmered as a cooptation of non-aption, and then, after the refinements of selective adaptation, it was further exapted in cultural environments through functional shifts. Here we embrace the hypothesis that such cross-level mechanisms connote the exaptation of the perception-action system, where the sensory-motor devices and their mechanism admit very different applications—high-level cognitive faculties involved in reasoning processes—with respect to the ones for which they evolved through functional adaptation. From Massive Modularity to Massive Redeployment A fundamental tenet of evolutionary psychology is modularity, where the functional decomposition of biological systems—into functional sub-systems (e.g., organs) incrementally adapted for specific tasks—is extended to cognitive processes and endowments ( Carruthers, 2006 ; see also Barrett and Kurzban, 2006 ). Innateness, along with Chomsky’s thesis on the poverty of stimulus, represents an argument in favor of the selective adaptation of cognitive faculties, as a set of evolved mechanisms that instantiate human problem solving abilities, substituting the necessity of learning everything from scratch. Gould and Lewontin strongly criticize the claim of adaptationism that “proceeds by breaking an organism into unitary ‘traits’ and proposing an adaptive story for each considered separately” ( Gould and Lewontin, 1979 , p. 581). Adaptations are generally referred to as structural (e.g., features of the human body), physiological (e.g., homeostatic mechanisms) or behavioral (e.g., inherited systems of behaviors) traits. Actually, the problem of the unit of analysis is crucial, since in Gould and Lewontin’s perspective we cannot make ontological distinctions but just the ones that are instrumental to evolutionary contingencies. Interestingly, this framework might also shed new light on the nature of automatic cognitive systems (sources of cognitive errors, in Kahneman’s view), which are plausibly more plastic and flexible than commonly assumed (see Bellini-Leite and Frankish, 2021 ). Its biasedness can be conceptualized as the instantiation of such evolutionary constraints from which specific reasoning processes originate. As bluntly argued by Williams (1992 , p. 484): “Adaptation is always asymmetrical; organisms adapt to their environment, never vice versa. ” Transposing this argument to the rationality debate, and using the Simon’s scissors argument, the cognitive blade adapts to the environmental blade. We think that this conception of a fixed and untouched environment in the rationality debate, might originate from Simon’s original emphasis on human problem-solving (e.g., Newell and Simon, 1972 ), according to which the environment is considered a mere task environment , representing the experimental setting used to comparatively assess human reasoning abilities (cf. Gray et al., 2006 ). Thus we agree with Laland et al. (2007) in recommending a rejection of the adaptive-lag hypothesis “in favor of a niche-construction perspective, which focuses on how human beings respond, and are themselves responses, to self-induced environmental changes” (p. 63; also see Laland and Seed, 2021 ). Cognitive arguments in favor of niche construction are abundant and central in externalist perspectives on embodied cognition ( Sterelny, 2010 ), as the environment is de The development of rationality in humans is enacted in a series of socio-cultural experiences, as the environment is significantly instantiated in interactions with others (cf. Gallagher, 2018 ). The enactivist approach, in particular, emphasizes the extended, intersubjective and socially situated nature of cognitive systems. From this perspective, the brain does not create an internal model of the world, but is conceptualized as a part of the larger system of brain-body-environment (for an overview see Newen et al., 2018 ).

Evolinguistics is an attempt to clarify the origins and evolution of language and communication, thereby deepening our understanding of humans from an evolutionary perspective. The origins of language is characterized by the biological evolution of abilities related to language and communication, and the evolution of language by the structuralization and complexification of language knowledge as well as communication systems through cultural evolution. In Evolinguistics, two idiosyncrasies of human linguistic communication are the primary focus, namely, using hierarchically organized symbol se

archaic humans. Social anthropology studies patterns of behaviour, while cultural anthropology studies cultural meaning, including norms and values. The Anthropology is the scientific study of humanity that crosses biology and sociology, concerned with human behavior, human biology, cultures, societies, and linguistics, in both the present and past, including archaic humans. Social anthropology studies patterns of behaviour, while cultural anthropology studies cultural meaning, including norms and values. The term sociocultural anthropology is com Anthropology is a global discipline involving the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. Anthropology builds upon knowledge from natural sciences, including the discoveries about the origin and evolution of Homo sapiens, human physical traits, human behavior, the variations among different groups of humans, how the evolutionary past of Homo sapiens has influenced its social organization and culture, and from social sciences, including the organization of human social and cultural relations, institutions, social conflicts, etc. Early anthropology originated in Classical Greece and Persia and studied and tried to understand observable cultural diversity. As such, anthropology has been central in the development of several new (late 20th century) interdisciplinary fields such as cognitive science, global studies, and various ethnic studies. According to Clifford Geertz, E… Anthropology is the scientific study of humanity that crosses biology and sociology, concerned with human behavior, human biology, cultures, societies, and linguistics, in both the present and past, including archaic humans. Social anthropology studies patterns of behaviour, while cultural anthropology studies cultural meaning, including norms and values. The term sociocultural anthropology is commonly used today. Linguistic anthropology studies how language influences social life. Biological (or physical) anthropology studies the biology and evolution of humans and their close primate relatives. In the United States, anthropology has traditionally been divided into the four field approach developed by Franz Boas in the early 20th century: biological or physical anthropology; social, cultural, or sociocultural anthropology; archaeological anthropology; and linguistic anthropology. These fields frequently overlap but tend to use different methodologies and techniques. European countries with overseas colonies tended to practice more ethnology (a term coined and defined by Adam F. Kollár in 1783). It is sometimes referred to as sociocultural anthropology in parts of the world influenced by the European tradition. Ethnoarchaeology is a branch of archaeology that studies the practices and material remains of living human groups to understand better the evidence left behind by past human groups presumed to have lived in similar ways. === Linguistic === Linguistic anthropology (not to be confused with anthropological linguistics) seeks to understand the processes of human communications, verbal and non-verbal, variation in language across time and space, the social uses of language, and the relationship between language and culture. People have their biological families, the people they share DNA with. This is called consanguinity or "blood ties". People can also have a chosen family in which they chose who they want to be a part of their family. In some cases, people are closer to their chosen family than to their biological families. ==== Feminist ==== Feminist anthropology is a four-field approach to anthropology (archeological, biological, cultural, linguistic) that seeks to reduce male bias in research findings, anthropological hiring practices, and the scholarly production of knowledge. However, Zora Neale Hurston, although often primarily considered to be a literary author, was trained in anthropology by Franz Boas, and published Tell my Horse about her "anthropological observations" of voodoo in the Caribbean (1938). Feminist anthropology is inclusive of the anthropology of birth as a specialization, which is the anthropological study of pregnancy and childbirth within cultures and societies. === Medical, nutritional, psychological, cognitive, and It also examines how the understanding of cognition, emotion, motivation, and similar psychological processes inform or constrain our models of cultural and social processes. ==== Cognitive ==== Cognitive anthropology seeks to explain patterns of shared knowledge, cultural innovation, and transmission over time and space using the methods and theories of the cognitive sciences (especially experimental psychology and evolutionary biology) often through close collaboration with historians, ethnographers, archaeologists, linguists, musicologists and other specialists engaged in the description and interpretation of cultural forms. Evolutionary anthropology is concerned with both the biological and cultural evolution of humans, past and present. It is based on a scientific approach, and brings together fields such as archaeology, behavioral ecology, psychology, primatology, and genetics. It is a dynamic and interdisciplinary field, drawing on many lines of evidence to understand the human experience, past and present. === Forensic === Forensic anthropology is the application of the science of physical anthropology and human osteology in a legal setting, most often in criminal cases where the victim's remains are in the advanced stages of decomposition. These dynamic relationships between what can be observed on the ground and what can be inferred from compiling many local observations remain fundamental to any anthropology, whether cultural, biological, linguistic, or archaeological. Biological anthropologists are interested in both human variation and in the possibility of human universals (behaviors, ideas, or concepts shared by virtually all human cultures). They use many different methods of study.

Abstract A recent meta-analysis performed by Wellman, Cross, and Watson clears the air surrounding young children's performance on tests of false belief by showing that it is highly likely that there is some type of conceptual development between 3 and 5 years of age that supports improved task performance. The data concerning the evolutionary origin of these abilities, however, is considerably less clear. Nonetheless, there is some reason to suspect that theory of mind is unique to our species, and that its original function was to provide a more abstract level of describing ancient behaviora

This paper aims to compare cognitive development in humans and chimpanzees to illuminate the evolutionary origins of human cognition. Comparison of morphological data and life history strongly highlights the common features of all primate species, including humans. The human mother-infant relationship is characterized by the physical separation of mother and infant, and the stable supine posture of infants, that enables vocal exchange, face-to-face communication, and manual gestures. The cognitive development of chimpanzees was studied using the participation observation method. It revealed th

Evolutionary psychologists have suggested that our brain is composed of evolved mechanisms. One extensively studied mechanism is the cheater detection module. This module would make people very good at detecting cheaters in a social exchange. A vast amount of research has illustrated performance facilitation on social contract selection tasks. This facilitation is attributed to the alleged automatic and isolated operation of the module (i.e., independent of general cognitive capacity). This study, using the selection task, tested the critical automaticity assumption in three experiments. Exper However, in all experiments, performance on a non-social contract version did depend on available cognitive capacity. Overall, findings validate the automatic and effortless nature of social exchange reasoning. status released display-pdf yes is-olf no is-manuscript no is-preprint no is-journal-matter no is-scanned no is-retracted no Received 2012 Sep 9; Accepted 2012 Dec 5; Collection date 2013. Introduction Half a century of reasoning and decision making research has shown that human thinking is often biased (e.g., [1] ). In a wide range of tasks, most people fail to give the correct logical response. One of the most famous examples is the Wason selection task [2] . However, in this paper we focus on the crucial assumption that differentiates the SCT and the SSSM, namely that the cheater detection module works independent of general cognitive resources (i.e. automaticity, see further). For decades, many experiments have illustrated the performance improvement on the selection task when participants have to detect cheaters in a social contract (e.g., [3] , [6] – [8] ). Moreover, a number of studies have presented initial evidence in support for a universal cheater detection module. However, in spite of this research, debates are still ongoing about the modular hypothesis for higher order brain functions such as reasoning [8] , [15] , [16] . The present article focuses on the key automaticity assumption of the postulated cheater detection module. In Cosmides and Tooby’s view, modules are assumed to operate independently and are distinct from general cognitive resources [17] . 66) In other words: “They ( modules) make certain kinds of inferences just as easy, effortless and ‘natural’ to humans as spinning a web is to a spider or building a dam is to a beaver.” ( [17] , p. 330) Note that automaticity is a complex and multilayered concept that has come to have a very-wide use. We use the concept here as it is typically used in reasoning studies. That is, it refers to an independency from general cognitive capacity (e.g., [19] – [21] ). Hence, the automaticity of the cheater detection module implies that the efficiency of cheater detection should be independent of general cognitive capacity. In the critical Experiment 3 we will validate the two initial correlational experiments with an experimental approach. We introduce a dual task load procedure to limit the available cognitive resources directly. Given that Next, in the load group the dot pattern that participants needed to remember was presented for 850 ms. Subsequently, the highlighted rule and the cards were presented ( Figure 3 ). Participants selected the cards as previously outlined and pressed the space bar when they finished the card selection. Finally, in the load group the empty matrix was presented and participants had to reproduce the dot pattern. We like to stress explicitly that in the present design the load was introduced after participants had read the scenario. This is not a trivial issue. The mere reading and linguistic processing of the scenario will also draw on cognitive resources (e.g., [36] ). To draw clear conclusions about the cognitive demands of social contract reasoning in a dual task study, it is critical that participants manage to represent the scenario properly (see [38] , for a similar point). This potential confound was avoided in the present study by introducing the load after participants finished reading the scenario. Results and Discussion Dot Memory Task Overall, the mean of correctly reproduced dots was 3.52 ( SD = .84, range 1–4), which amounts to 88% of the dot pattern that was correctly localized. Taken together these findings clearly imply that solving a social contract version is automatic and does not draw on general cognitive resources. This supports the postulated automaticity of the cheater detection module. Our findings are thus consistent with the modular view of Cosmides and Tooby. However, it will be clear that the fact that a process is automatic does not necessarily imply that it is also modular, of course (e.g., [22] , [39] ). Also, to the extent that other accounts make an automaticity assumption, our study does not allow us to decide between these accounts. Put bluntly: introducing the load before participants read the social contract scenario or presenting these selection tasks to very young children might amount to presenting the rule and cards without the scenario. Clearly, when the module is not activated, performance facilitation should not be expected (see also, [38] ). In sum, in the present paper, we have examined a crucial property of evolutionary theories of social exchange reasoning, namely the independence of a specialized cheater detection algorithm from general-purpose cognitive processes. In each of our experiments, we found that available cognitive resources were consistently related to performance on standard descriptive selection tasks, whereas cognitive resources were clearly un -related to performance on social contract selection tasks. Taken together, the findings lend credence to the evolutionary claim of an automatically operating cheater detection module. Funding Statement Writing of this manuscript was partly supported by KU Leuven Center of Excellence on Generalization Research (GRIP*TT; PF/10/005). No additional external funding received for this study.