University funding and ranking structures provide institutional incentives for advisors to graduate PhD students on time.
the verdict
INSUFFICIENT LEANING
refutedsupported
the weight of evidence
2 sources for · 0 against
AS REPORTEDno primary record reached; this is what the reporting says
Retrieved evidence partially addresses advisor incentives in PhD programs, noting that funding council structures can impose completion pressures while other factors may encourage retaining student labor, but comprehensive evidence on ranking structures providing institutional graduation incentives is absent.
often offers little incentive to move students through PhD programs quickly and may even provide incentives to slow them down. To counter this problem
A Doctor of Philosophy (PhD, DPhil; Latin: philosophiae doctor or doctor in philosophia) is a terminal degree that usually denotes the highest level of academic achievement in a given discipline and is awarded following a course of graduate study and original research. The name of the degree is most often abbreviated PhD (or, at times, as Ph.D. in North America) and is pronounced as three separate
There is usually a preliminary assessment to remain in the program and the thesis is submitted at the end of a three- to four-year program. These periods are usually extended pro rata for part-time students. With special dispensation, the final date for the thesis can sometimes be extended for additional years, for a total of up to six or seven. For full-time PhDs, a four-year time limit has now been fixed and students must apply for an extension to submit a thesis past this point. Since the early 1990s, British funding councils have adopted a policy of penalising departments where large proportions of students fail to submit their theses in four years after achieving PhD-student status (or pro rata equivalent) by reducing the number of funded places in subsequent years. Inadvertently, this leads to significant pressure on the candidate to minimise the scope of projects with a view on thesis submission, regardless of quality, and discourage time spent on activities that would otherwise further the impact of the research on the community (e.g., publications in high-impact journals, seminars, workshops). Furthermore, supervising staff are encouraged in their career progression to ensure that the PhD students under their supervision finalise the projects in three rather than the four years that the program is permitted to cover. These issues contribute to an overall discrepancy between supervisors and PhD candidates in the priority they assign to the quality and impact of the research contained in a PhD project.
There has recently been an increase in the number of Integrated PhD programs available, such as at the University of Southampton. These courses include a Master of Research (MRes) in the first year, which consists of a taught component as well as laboratory rotation projects. The PhD must then be completed within the next three years. As this includes the MRes all deadlines and timeframes are brought forward to encourage completion of both MRes and PhD within four years from commencement. These programs are designed to provide students with a greater range of skills than a standard PhD, and for the university, they are a means of gaining an extra years'…
# What incentives does an advisor have to help PhD students graduate in a timely manner?
Tags: phd, advisor, graduation
- Score: 29
- Views: 7180
- Answers: 7
- Answered: yes
- Asked by: ff524 (110642 rep)
- Asked: 2016-01-08
- Edited: 2017-04-13
- Site: academia
## Question
I've heard it suggested several times on this site that advisors (especially in experimental fields where the PI may benefit from a cheap, highly skilled workforce) have an incentive to prevent their PhD students from graduating in a timely manner, or at least that they have no incentive to actively promote graduation when the student is "ready." (Whatever "ready" means for that particular student.)
For example, user47148 says
You are the only one who cares if you finish. To your advisor you are cheap labor.
bfoste01 says
I often wonder if keeping highly-skilled cheap labor around to do something with the data that a PI is collecting from a high-profile grant is often an implicit factor that impacts students' trajectories. In which case it is not uncommon to see students in their 6th or 7th year of the program receive funding.
and grandmah77 refers to
keeping your advisor from keeping you there for
Everything we examined (2)
This check searched the claim as stated. It did not run a separate search for evidence against it.