trustme.bro/r/…
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the claim
Tit-for-tat strategies can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in repeated games with sufficient discount factors
the verdict
COMMON KNOWLEDGE
no citation needed for this one
refutedsupported
the weight of evidence
no sources on either side

The sustainability of tit-for-tat and cooperative strategies as equilibria in repeated games based on discount factors is a foundational result of game theory (the Folk Theorems) and does not require citation.

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The analysis

The claim refers to a standard, foundational mathematical result in game theory (the Folk Theorems regarding repeated games and discount factors). As a textbook definition and core tenet of game-theoretic analysis, it is common knowledge within the discipline and requires no empirical citation.

Everything we examined (12)
We also searched for evidence AGAINST this claim, not only for it.
  1. Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma.peer-reviewedno side takennot shown: read and judged not to bear on this claim
  2. Theory of mind: did evolution fool us?peer-reviewedno side takennot shown: read and judged not to bear on this claim
  3. Mutation enhances cooperation in direct reciprocity.peer-reviewedno side takennot shown: read and judged not to bear on this claim
  4. High mutual cooperation rates in rats learning reciprocal altruism: The role of payoff matrix.peer-reviewedno side takennot shown: read and judged not to bear on this claim
  5. Evolution of direct reciprocity in group-structured populations.peer-reviewedno side takennot shown: read and judged not to bear on this claim
  6. Intrinsic fluctuations of reinforcement learning promote cooperation.peer-reviewedno side takennot shown: read and judged not to bear on this claim
  7. Emergence and suppression of cooperation by action visibility in transparent games.peer-reviewedno side takennot shown: read and judged not to bear on this claim
  8. Applications of game theory in deep learning: a survey.peer-reviewedno side takennot shown: read and judged not to bear on this claim
  9. Equal Pay for all Prisoners / The Logic of Contritionpeer-reviewedno side takennot shown: read and judged not to bear on this claim
  10. Emotions and courtship help bonded pairs cooperate, but emotional agents are vulnerable to deceit.peer-reviewedno side takennot shown: read and judged not to bear on this claim
  11. Cognitive Model of Trust Dynamics Predicts Human Behavior within and between Two Games of Strategic Interaction with Computerized Confederate Agents.peer-reviewedno side takennot shown: read and judged not to bear on this claim
  12. Recognising and evaluating the effectiveness of extortion in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.peer-reviewedno side takennot shown: read and judged not to bear on this claim
The paper trail · every fact has a biography
first checked05 Aug 2026
judged → COMMON KNOWLEDGE · 9505 Aug 2026
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