The principal-agent problem was first introduced in specific foundational economics literature.
The principal-agent problem is a well-established concept in foundational economic literature concerning the dynamics between principals and delegates.
The claim is a specific, verifiable statement about the origins and presence of the principal-agent problem in foundational economic literature, which is supported by the context of the retrieved literature discussing its economic and governance applications.
Ioannis A. Kaskarelis. The principal‐agent problem in economics and in politics. 2010. https://doi.org/10.1108/08288661011090866
This paper discusses the principal-agent problem as established in foundational economic and political contexts regarding asset management and delegated rights.
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Gordon L. Clark, Ashby H. B. Monk. Outsourcing and the Principal–Agent Problem. 2017. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198793212.003.0009
This chapter references the conventional models and economic literature surrounding the principal-agent problem in pension-fund governance and management.
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