The NSA builds backdoors into encryption algorithms
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Reference literature and documentation establish that the NSA has deliberately inserted a backdoor into a cryptographic algorithm standard, specifically the Dual_EC_DRBG pseudorandom number generator.
While designers of cryptographic algorithms are rarely considered as potential adversaries, past examples, such as the standardization of the Dual EC PRNG highlights that the story might be more complicated. To prevent the existence of backdoors, the concept of rigidity was introduced in the specific context of curve generation. The idea is to first state a strict scope statement for the properties that the curve needs to have and then pick e.g. the one with the smallest parameters. The aim is to ensure that the designers did not have the degrees of freedom that allows the addition of a trapdoor. In this paper, we apply this approach to symmetric algorithms. The task is challenging because the corresponding primitives are more complex: they consist of several sub-components of different types, and the properties required by these sub-components to achieve the desired security level are not as clearly defined. Furthermore, security often comes in this case from the interplay between these components rather than from their individual properties. In this paper, we argue that it is nevertheless necessary to demand that symmetric algorithms have a similar but, due to their different nature, more complex property which we call "unswervingness''. We motivate this need via a study of the literature on symmetric "kleptography'' and via the study of some real-world standards. We then suggest some guidelines that could be used to leverage the unswervingness of a symmetric algorithm to standardize a highly trusted and equally safe variant of it.
Backdoor (computing)
In computing, a backdoor is a way of bypassing security mechanisms to gain access to a resource that is otherwise secured. Backdoors give illegal access to an otherwise secured resource. A common example for a backdoor is the existence of default passwords which can be used to access the BIOS of a computer. Very often, special programs that run on a computer provide the functionality of a backdoor.
List of known backdoors in standards
- the MD2 algorithm was found in the 1996 announcement of RFC6149 to have a backdoor[1]
- Ron Rivest's MD4 hash was found in the 2011 announcement of RFC6150 to have a backdoor[1]
- Rivest's MD5 hash was shown to have several weaknesses in 1996 by Hans Dobbertin[1]
- SHA-0 (aka FIPS-180) was withdrawn after CRYPTO '98[2]
- SHA-1 (aka FIPS-180-1) was shown to be attackable in 2005 by Eli Biham and co-authors, as well as Vincent Rijmen and Elisabeth Oswald[2]
- The Dual_EC_DRBG cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator was revealed in 2013 to have a kleptographic backdoor deliberately inserted by NSA, who also had the private key to the backdoor.
Holistic Approach to the Encryption Debate 195 | Encryption as Open Innovation Encryption at its most basic … potential introduction of backdoors into encryption implementations. The next section builds on the economic argu- … that security puzzle is the process of encryption. Encryption Cryptography affords a measure of security
when consumers wanted encryption in the wake of Edward Snowden's disclosures about NSA surveillance of private … and the activity of the NSA — and it is a crucial distinction — is that the NSA could only access corporate … potential overreach of the NSA. Big Brother in the Internet Age 83 In 2012, the NSA submitted 1,856 requests
Dual_EC_DRBG. The backdoor would allow NSA to decrypt for example SSL/TLS encryption which used Dual_EC_DRBG as a CSPRNG. Members of the ANSI standard
Dual_EC_DRBG (Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator) is an algorithm that was presented as a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG) using methods in elliptic curve cryptography. Despite wide public criticism, including the public identification of the possibility that the National Security Agency put a backdoor into a recommended implementation, it was,
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In an era where digital encryption provides virtually impenetrable security, law enforcement's push for mandatory "backdoors" raises significant legal questions beyond the commonly debated privacy concerns. This article examines the judicial and legislative attempts to compel encryption backdoors through the lens of established legal principles. Current judicial attempts to use the All Writs Act to mandate backdoors exceed statutory authority by disregarding limitations set by the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) and Congressional intent. Furthermore, this article demonstrates that encryption code is protected speech under the First Amendment, making backdoor mandates an unconstitutional form of compelled speech that fails to meet strict scrutiny standards. By analyzing key cases, including United States v. New York Tel. Co., the Apple-FBI dispute, and relevant First Amendment jurisprudence, this work argues that protecting strong encryption is not merely a technical necessity, but a constitutional imperative essential to preserving the separation of powers and protecting fundamental rights in the digital age.
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