Atheists are frequent targets of prejudice and discrimination. Previous research suggests that anti-atheist prejudice may stem in part from perceptions of religion as an ultimate basis for morality: without God, why do good (or not do bad)? We conducted two studies to test whether presenting recent scientific findings regarding the nonreligious bases of morality (e.g., morality in nonhuman primates and preverbal infants) might lead people to view morality as innate, thus reducing intuitive associations of immorality and atheism. Consistent with previous research, participants viewed moral transgressions as more representative of atheists than of Christians. However, learning about the putatively innate nature of morality did not lead participants to view immorality as less representative of atheists. Intuitive moral distrust of atheists appears quite resilient, persisting even in the face of evidence for the nonreligious origins of morality. Mudd, T L et al. 2015 The Roots of Right and Wrong: Do Concepts of Innate Morality Reduce Intuitive Associations of Immorality With Atheism? Secularism and Nonreligion, 4: 10, pp. 1–6, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/snr.bc Frans thinks that people are born with an innate moral sense. Larry thinks that morality results from years of care- ful instruction and enculturation. Who is more likely to think that serial killers are atheists? In this paper, we pre - sent data from three studies aimed at testing the hypoth - esis that intuitive associations of immorality with atheism derive, in part, from people’s perceptions of the very roots of right and wrong. In this view, it is perhaps a futile exercise to try to identify one single psychological foundation (such as intergroup conflict) for all expressions of prejudice against different groups. Instead, evolutionary approaches RESEARCH ARTICLE The Roots of Right and Wrong: Do Concepts of Innate Morality Reduce Intuitive Associations of Immorality With Atheism? Tommy L. Mudd*, Maxine B. Najle*, Ben K. L. Ng* and Will Gervais* Atheists are frequent targets of prejudice and discrimination. Previous research suggests that anti-atheist prejudice may stem in part from perceptions of religion as an ultimate basis for morality: without God, why do good (or not do bad)? We conducted two studies to test whether presenting recent scientific findings regarding the nonreligious bases of morality (e.g., morality in nonhuman primates and preverbal infants) might lead people to view morality as innate, thus reducing intuitive associations of immorality and atheism. Consistent with previous research, participants viewed moral transgressions as more repre- sentative of atheists than of Christians. However, learning about the putatively innate nature of morality did not lead participants to view immorality as less representative of atheists. In support of this possibility, Gervais (2014) found that various moral transgressions, ranging from minor offenses like cheating at cards to much more serious transgres - sions like serial murder, are seen as representative of atheists, but not of 11 other religious and ethnic groups. Further, even atheist participants still viewed these moral transgressions as more representative of atheists than of other groups. Finally, the results were driven specifically by moral doubts stemming from atheists’ lack of belief in gods rather than from their lack of belonging to religious moral communities. Pilot Study Before testing our focal hypotheses regarding the degree to which notions of innate morality might reduce intui - tive associations of immorality with atheism, we first conducted a pilot study to determine whether Finally, participants completed several demographic meas- ures where they provided information on their age, gender, ethnicity, religion, attitudes towards others, along with belief in God, political ideology, and socioeconomic status. Results To test whether the innate morality prime changed the degree to which participants viewed moral viola - tions of atheists, we conducted a 2 (condition: Control vs. Bonobos) x 2 (target: atheist vs. Christian) logistic regression. Even though there are variations, the broader concept of origi - nal sin is that humans are born into the world with a sinful nature, due at least partly to Adam and Eve. Many bibli - cal passages clearly state that humans are born with sin, such as Psalm 51.5, “Behold, I was shapen in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me” (King James Version). Such passages could lead to a perception that humans’ innate nature for being good does not preclude us from the capacity for evil, given our already sinful nature at birth. Dissonance can be reduced in several ways, and one of them is especially pertinent: justify cognition by adding new cognitions. In this respect, people may view some aspects of moral - ity as innate, but may also believe that without some religious instructions, atheists may along the way “lose” their morality without proper guidance from a morally- concerned religious figure or doctrine. Thus, believing that morality is innate does not necessarily lead people to think that morality is stable and unchangeable. One can easily imagine how a person can initially be a good person, but over time regress to immorality without proper instruction. Despite this malleability and the distrust centrality of moral distrust to anti-atheist prejudice, shifting opinions about the putative innateness of morality does not seem to affect perceptions of atheists as immoral, suggesting that distrust of atheists is more ingrained than might otherwise be expected. People may come to believe that morality is largely innate, without coming to believe that atheists are as able to effectively resist their most base urges. Competing Interests The authors declare that they have no competing interests. Appendix A Moral Violation Scenarios 1. Richard was driving home from work one day through a bad neighborhood.

emotions of children and adults when exhibiting good and bad behavior. The importance of innate feelings and hunches in regards to morality are also being contemplated Moral development focuses on the emergence, change, and understanding of morality from infancy through adulthood. The theory states that morality develops across the lifespan in a variety of ways. Morality is influenced by an individual's experiences, behavior, and when they are faced with moral issues through different periods of physical and cognitive development. Morality concerns an individua Based… However, if the parent punishes the older child or there is a consequence to their behavior, the younger child often does not act like the older one because they were able to observe that that behavior was “unacceptable” by the “society” surrounding them, meaning their family. This example coincides with the fact that children know that stealing, killing, and lying is bad, and honesty, kindness, and being polite is good. === Evolutionary Theory === The Evolutionary Theory of Morality tries to explain morality and its development in terms of evolution and how it may at first seem contradictory for humans to have morals and morality in the evolutionary opinion. Recent research on children's theory of mind (ToM) has focused on when children understand others' intentions The moral concept of one's intentionality develops with experience in the world. Yuill (1984) presented evidence that comprehension of one's intentions plays a role in moral Moreover, in children's moral thinking there comes a time when morality and moral decisions are made based on consequences, that is to say that they start weighing intentions in order to decide and learn whether something is morally okay or not. An example of this can be seen in identifying the intentions of specific behaviors. We as a society also operate in that way because the same outcome or behavior can be considered acceptable had the intentions for it been good versus another time where the intentions were bad and in that case it would be unacceptable. In a situation where a child is trying to help their parent clean and misplaces something accidentally, it is easily forgiven and is considered morally acceptable because his/her intentions were good. However, if the child purposely hid the object so their parent would not find it, it is morally unacceptable because the intentions were bad. Ultimately, it is the same situation and same outcome but the intentions are different. At the age of 10–11 years children realize this concept and start justifying their actions and behaviors by weighing their intentions. ==== Understanding Rules ==== In Kohlberg's theory of moral development there are six definite stages. The first stage is called obedience and punishment orientation. And this stage is governed by the concept of having rules, laws, and things that one must follow. In children there is a set of rules set down by their authority figures, often being their parents. At this stage of moral development, morality is defined by these rules and laws that they think are set in stone and can never change. To a child, these rules are ones that can never be wrong and that define good and bad and show the difference between them. Later on however, these rules become more like guidelines and can change based on the situation they are presented in. Another aspect of these rules is the concept of punishment and reinforcement and that's how children realize what is considered morally okay or not. An example of this is in the dilemmas used by Kohlberg, when he asked children to justify or judge the situation and their answer was always justified by something similar to “this is not fair” or “this is wrong because lying is bad” etc. This shows that at this particular stage children are not yet contributing members in terms of moral development. ==== Applying Theory of Mind ==== The theory of mind tells us that children need to develop a sense of self in order to develop morality and moral concepts. As the child develops, s/he needs to experience and observe in order to realize how they fit into society and eventually become part of it thereby establishing a sense of self-identity. This sense of self-identity depends on many things and it is important to develop and learn from those stages in order to fully develop understand good from bad. ==== Moral Socialization ==== Moral socialization talks about how morality is passed on. This perspective says that adults or parents pass down and teach their children the acceptable behavior through techniques and teaching as well as punishments and reinforcements. Despite this, modern research explains that children are more morally mature than Kohlberg had noted. On top of that, there is no strong evidence to suggest that people go from conventional to postconventional. Lastly, it is now known that Kohlberg's theory is biased against numerous people. ==== New Approaches to Morality ==== The main focus of developmentalists now is how important emotion is in terms of morality. Developmental researchers are examining the emotions of children and adults when exhibiting good and bad behavior. The importance of innate feelings and hunches in regards to morality are also being contemplated by doctors. However, adolescence and childhood lack a distinct separation in stages of moral development, rather adolescence is when moral skills learned in childhood fully develop and become more refined than previously seen. === Cross-cultural ethical principles === Some researchers have developed three categories for understanding ethical principles found cross-culturally: ethics of autonomy, ethics of community, and ethics of divinity. Ethics of autonomy (rights, freedom, justice), which are usually emphasized in individualistic/Western cultures, are centered on protecting and promoting individuals’ ability to make decisions based on their personal preferences.

include simple and complex concepts, learned and innate concepts, concrete and abstract concepts, and natural and logical concepts. The classical theory A concept is a fundamental unit of cognition that classifies entities and encodes shared features. Concepts make it possible to form and combine ideas, draw inferences, and refer to external objects. They act as the meanings of words and play a central role in many cognitive processes, including perception, memory, and reasoning. Researchers distinguish different types of concepts based on their i Other distinctions focus on how concepts group entities into classes. Relational concepts describe entities by their interactions with or connections to other things, such as the concepts obstacle and grandmother. They include goal-derived concepts, which organize items according to an external function or a shared purpose. For example, the category diet foods includes a variety of otherwise dissimilar items that serve the purpose of supporting weight loss. Relational concepts contrast with intrinsically defined concepts, which group entities based on inherent properties independent of extrinsic purposes or external roles, such as the concept triangle. Other proposed types include affective categories, which group entities by the emotions they evoke, and ad hoc categories, which are formed spontaneously, typically in response to situational demands, such as the concept things to grab in a fire. General concepts apply to many entities, while singular concepts refer to one specific entity, and empty concepts have no instances. Superordinate and subordinate concepts are distinguished by their level of specificity, as in the contrast between the concepts animal and mouse. Concepts can also be classified by domain. Everyday concepts are non-technical categories used in daily life. They are usually practical, intuitive groupings relevant to ordinary interaction with the world but without precise definitions or exact boundaries A concept is a fundamental unit of cognition that classifies entities and encodes shared features. Concepts make it possible to form and combine ideas, draw inferences, and refer to external objects. They act as the meanings of words and play a central role in many cognitive processes, including perception, memory, and reasoning. Researchers distinguish different types of concepts based on their internal structure, mode of acquisition, and domain. These include simple and complex concepts, learned and innate concepts, concrete and abstract concepts, and natural and logical concepts. The classical theory holds that concepts are essentially definitions, each characterized by fixed rules determining to which entities the concept applies. Prototype theory rejects this outlook, arguing that concept membership depends on similarity to a prototype—a cluster of features typically associated with the category. According to exemplar theory, similarity derives from individual memories of concrete instances rather than a single prototypical summary representation. Theory theory maintains that concepts are embedded in domain-specific theories, while conceptual atomism argues that lexical concepts are separate units without internal structure. Philosophers debate whether concepts are mental representations or abstract objects that exist independently of individual minds. Concept learning is the process of acquiring a new concept, which is required before an individual can use it. Suggested Other distinctions focus on how concepts group entities into classes. Relational concepts describe entities by their interactions with or connections to other things, such as the concepts obstacle and grandmother. They include goal-derived concepts, which organize items according to an external function or a shared purpose. For example, the category diet foods includes a variety of otherwise dissimilar items that serve the purpose of supporting weight loss. Relational concepts contrast with intrinsically defined concepts, which group entities based on inherent properties independent of extrinsic purposes or external roles, such as the concept triangle. Other proposed types include affective categories, which group entities by the emotions they evoke, and ad hoc categories, which are formed spontaneously, typically in response to situational demands, such as the concept things to grab in a fire. General concepts apply to many entities, while singular concepts refer to one specific entity, and empty concepts have no instances. Superordinate and subordinate concepts are distinguished by their level of specificity, as in the contrast between the concepts animal and mouse. Concepts can also be classified by domain. Everyday concepts are non-technical categories used in daily life. They are usually practical, intuitive groupings relevant to ordinary interaction with the world but without precise definitions or exact boundaries. Scientific concepts, by contrast, are more precise and may lack immediate relevance to everyday experience. They are often based on exact definitions, typically with the goal of eliminating ambiguity and ensuring consistent measurement, prediction, and explanation. More fine-grained classifications distinguish between the specific fields to which concepts belong, including mathematical, linguistic, psychological, and moral concepts. Descriptive concepts provide neutral characterizations of entities. Evaluative or normative concepts, by contrast, concern values and norms, expressing what should be rather than what is. They are further divided into thin and thick concepts. Thin concepts encode pure evaluations without additional descriptive contents, such as right and wrong or good and bad. Thick concepts combine evaluative and descriptive features, indicating both what something is and how it should be assessed. For example, courageous and cruel are thick concepts since they express character traits in addition to evaluations.

man is innate and indestructible, and which has been shown to be the sole source of non-egoistic conduct, this kind alone being of real moral worth. Now