Does the Principle of Computational Equivalence Overcome the Objections against Computationalism? | Springer Nature Link Skip to main content Advertisement Does the Principle of Computational Equivalence Overcome the Objections against Computationalism? Chapter pp 225–233 Cite this chapter Save chapter View saved research Computing Nature Abstract Computationalism has been variously defined as the idea that the human mind can be modelled by means of mechanisms broadly equivalent to Turing Machines. Computationalism’s claims have been hotly debated and arguments against and for have drawn extensively from mathematics, cognitive sciences and philosophy, although the debate is hardly settled. On the other hand, in his 2002 book New Kind of Science, Stephen Wolfram advanced what he called the Principle of Computational Equivalence (PCE), whose main contention is that fairly simple systems can easily reach very complex behaviour and become as powerful as any possible system based on rules (that is, they are computationally equivalent). He also claimed that any natural (and even human) phenomenon can be explained as the interaction of very simple rules. Of course, given the universality of Turing Machine-like mechanisms, PCE could be considered simply a particular brand of computationalism, subject to the same objections as previous attempts. In this paper we analyse in depth if this view of PCE is justified or not and hence if PCE can overcome some criticisms and be a different and better model of the human mind. This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access. Cartographies of the Mind, Chapter 3, 37–49 (2007) Article Google Scholar Dodig-Crnkovic, G., Mueller, V.: A dialogue concerning two world systems: info-computational vs. mechanistic. In: Dodig Crnkovic, G., Burgin, M. (eds.) Information and Computation, pp. 149–184. World Scientific Publishing Co., Inc., Singapore (2009) Google Scholar Dodig-Crnkovic, G.: Biological Information and Natural Computation. In: Vallverdú, J. (ed.) Thinking Machines and the Philosophy of Computer Science: Concepts and Principles, Information Science Reference. IGI Global, Hershey (2010) Google Scholar Dodig-Crnkovik, G.: Dynamics of Information as Natural Computation. MIT Press, Cambridge (1981) Google Scholar Fodor, J.A.: Theory of Content and Other Essays. MIT Press, Cambridge (1990) Google Scholar Fodor, J.A.: The Elm and the Expert. MIT Press, Cambridge (1993) Google Scholar Fodor, J.A.: Concepts. Clarendon Press, Oxford (1998) Book Google Scholar Garrido, A.: Connectionism vs. Computationalism Theory of Mind. BRAIN (Broad Research in Artificial Intelligence and Neuroscience)  1(1) (2010) Google Scholar Horst, S.: Mind Computationalism Theory. University of California Press, Berkeley (1986) Google Scholar Horst, S.: Symbols, Computation and Intentionality: A Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind. University of California Press, Berkeley (1996) Google Scholar The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/ Kelemen, J., Alica, K.: The New Computationalism: a Lesson from Embodied Agents. Silesram University, Institute of Computer Science Press, Opava, Slovakia (2008) Google Scholar McCulloch, W.S., Pitts, W.H.: A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 7, 115–133 (1943) Article MathSciNet Google Scholar Piccinini, G.: The first Computational theory of mind and brain: a close look at McCulloch and Pitts’s Logical calculus of ideas immanent in nervous activity. 7, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis (1975) Google Scholar Sayre, K.: Intentionality and information processing: An alternative model for cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9(1), 121–138 (1986) Article Google Scholar Searle, J.: Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 417–424 (1980) Article Google Scholar Searle, J.: Is the Brain a digital computer? Proceedings and Addresses of American Philosophical Association 64, 21–37 (1990) Article Google Scholar Smith, A.: Universality of Wolfram’s 2,3 Turing Machine (2007) Google Scholar Sutner, K.: Cellular automata and intermediate degrees. Theoretical Computer Science 296, 365–375 (2003) Article MathSciNet MATH Google Scholar Sutner, K.: Universality and Cellular Automata. MCU, 50–59 (2004) Google Scholar Turing, A.M.: Lecture to the London Mathematical Society on 20 February 1947. In: Ince, D. (ed.) Mechanical Intelligence, pp. 87–105. North-Holland, Amsterdam (1947) Google Scholar Turing, A.M.: Intelligent Machinery. In: Ince, D. (ed.) Mechanical Intelligence, pp. 87–106. North-Holland, Amsterdam (1948) Google Scholar Turing, A.M.: Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind 59, 433–460 (1950) Article MathSciNet Google Scholar