In retrospect, the United States sponsored coup d'état in Iran of August 19, 1953, has emerged as a critical event in postwar world history. The government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq which was ousted in the coup was the last popular, democratically oriented government to hold office in Iran. The regime replacing it was a dictatorship that suppressed all forms of popular political activity, producing tensions that contributed greatly to the 1978–1979 Iranian revolution. If Mosaddeq had not been overthrown, the revolution might not have occurred. The 1953 coup also marked the first peacetime use of covert action by the United States to overthrow a foreign government. As such, it was an important precedent for events like the 1954 coup in Guatemala and the 1973 overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile, and made the United States a key target of the Iranian revolution. If Mosaddeq had not been overthrown, the revolution might not have occurred. The 1953 coup also marked the first peacetime use of covert action by the United States to overthrow a foreign government. As such, it was an important precedent for events like the 1954 coup in Guatemala and the 1973 overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile, and made the United States a key target of the Iranian revolution. Information Type Articles Information International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 19 , Issue 3 , August 1987 , pp. Google Scholar At least one participant in the coup went on to achieve considerable notoriety with similar operations in Syria, Nepal, and Vietnam. See The Wall Street Journal , 10 19, 1979 , p. 1 Google Scholar . No less an authority than Richard Helms, CIA director from 1965 until 1973, described the 1953 coup to me as an important model for CIA covert operations elsewhere (telephone interview, Washington, D.C., July 26, 1984). 2 2 Roosevelt , Kermit , Countercoup ( New York : McGraw-Hill , 1979 ). Google Scholar For a good discussion of the flaws in this account see the reviews by Cottam , Richard , in Iranian Studies , 14 , 2–4 ( Summer – Autumn 1981 ), 269 –72, CrossRef Google Scholar and Powers , Thomas , in The Nation , April 12, 1980 , 437 –40. Google Scholar The first public account of the coup in the American press was leaked by the CIA during the 1954 U.S. elections. See Richard , and Harkness , Gladys , “ The Mysterious Doings of CIA ,” Saturday Evening Post , 11 6 , 1954 , 66 – 68 . Google Scholar Incomeplete accounts are also given by Tully , Andrew , CIA, the Inside Story ( New York , Morrow , 1962 ), ch. support for Baqai at this time. See “Internal Situation,” n.d., FO/248/1531. On the split in the Pan-Iranist party see “The Friendly Relationship …” 10 June 1053, FO/371/104568, and “Pan-Iranism: The Ultimate in Iranian Nationalism,” February 6, 1952, Record Group 84, Box 29. The latter document refers to a “mysterious mastermind” directing the Pan-Iranists, whom one knowledgeable CIA figure believes was the CIA director of BEDAMN (August 1983 interview). The Soviets were apparently aware of these activities. In early August 1953, a statement was made on Radio Moscow that the United States had armed Baqai and his followers. Google Scholar 54 54 See “Iranian Political Developments from the End of March to the Overthrow of the Mosadeq Regime…,” October 28 1953; and Cottam , , Nationalism in Iran , pp. 277 –82. Google Scholar 55 55 Roosevelt interview. The February meeting is described in Roosevelt , , Countercoup , pp. 120 –24. For U.S. views on Zahedi see Department of State, Local army and air force units were to establish a base from which to seek control over the whole country. Key oil and rail installations in Tehran were to have been sabotaged to create a diversion. While a number of plans were discussed by the American and Iranian conspirators, none of the CIA sources I interviewed could recall such a plan. 66 66 The CIA role in organizing this “fake” Tudeh crowd, which played a critical role in the coup and is not discussed in other published accounts, was confirmed to me in interviews with at least five CIA participants. One CIA participant told me in an August 1983 interview that by Wednesday Mosaddeq's forces had located the general neighborhood where Zahedi was hiding and were preparing to seize him. Neither of the CIA officers who delivered the money to Aramesh could confirm to me that it went to Kashani; both, however, believe that it did (August 1983 and March 1984 interviews). Several days after the coup the British received a report from the Iraqi ambassador in Tehran that the Shah and Zahedi together had visited Kashani, kissed his hands, and thanked him for his help in restoring the monarchy. See “An Account of Conversation,” 1 September 1953, FO/371/104571. Google Scholar 71 71 Byroade interview; interviews with Gordon Mattison (Bethesda, MD, June 30, 1984) and Roy Melbourne (Chapel Hill, NC, February 1, 1984). Byroade and Henderson both went along with the coup reluctantly, according to these sources. Central Intelligence Agency, Probable Developments in Iran Through 1953, NIE-75 , 13 November 1952 (this document was obtained from the CIA under the Freedom of Information Act); Google Scholar Department of State, Office of Intelligence and Research, Iran's Political and Economic Prospects Through 1953, OIR No. CrossRef Google Scholar Citino, Nathan J. 2000. Defending the ‘postwar petroleum order’: The US, Britain and the 1954 Saudi‐Onassis Tanker deal . Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 11, Issue. 2, p. 137. CrossRef Google Scholar Abrahamian, Ervand 2001. The 1953 Coup in Iran* . Science & Society: A Journal of Marxist Thought and Analysis, Vol. 65, Issue. 2, p. 182. CrossRef Google Scholar Sick, Gary 2001. Iran at the Crossroads . p. 191. CrossRef Google Scholar LITTLE, DOUGLAS 2004. Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of Covert Action in the Middle East . Diplomatic History, Vol. 28, Issue. 5, p. 663. CrossRef Google Scholar Foran, John 2005. Taking Power .