Terrorists behave rationally in pursuing strategic political objectives.
Scholarly literature utilizing game-theoretic and predictive frameworks widely models terrorist organizations and hostile adversaries as rational actors pursuing strategic objectives.
The retrieved literature consistently discusses modeling terrorists and adversaries through game theory and strategic attacker-defender frameworks, supporting the premise that they can be analyzed as rational actors pursuing political or tactical goals. Papers [0], [1], and [2] directly engage with modeling adversarial or terrorist behavior using rational agent assumptions. Papers [3], [4], [5], [6], and [7] are tangential and do not discuss terrorists.
Ho E, Rajagopalan A, Skvortsov A, Arulampalam S, Piraveenan M. Game Theory in Defence Applications: A Review.. 2022. https://doi.org/10.3390/s22031032
Reviews game theory models that successfully treat hostile actors and adversarial entities as rational players pursuing strategic choices.
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Hunt K, Zhuang J. A review of attacker-defender games: Current state and paths forward.. 2024. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2023.04.009
Examines attacker-defender games and notes that the majority of literature successfully models adversarial threats by assuming rationality.
Jiang D, Wu J, Ding F, Ide T, Scheffran J, Helman D, Zhang S, Qian Y, Fu J, Chen S, Xie X, Ma T, Hao M, Ge Q. An integrated deep-learning and multi-level framework for understanding the behavior of terrorist groups.. 2023. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e18895
Uses advanced data and behavioral frameworks to demonstrate that terrorist groups follow discernible attack patterns and strategic behaviors.
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