Repeated bidding in an auction makes each player's type common knowledge
Economic and game-theoretic literature indicates that repeated strategic interactions and bidding processes tend to cause players to reveal their private information.
Paper [2] explicitly shows that bidders will reveal all their information in a variety of contexts, and paper [3] discusses how signals and private data are revealed over the course of incomplete information games. Paper [1] and [0] are tangential (discussing seller information revelation and wargaming frameworks respectively). Therefore, the claim is supported.
Jean-Pierre Benoit, Juan Dubra. Information Revelation in Auctions. 2003. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.426780
Demonstrates that in a variety of auction and strategic contexts, bidders will ultimately reveal all their private information over the course of the interaction.
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Xiaochi Wu. Differential games with incomplete information : signals and revelation. https://doi.org/10.70675/f1ee6094z282ez4e6bz9ae0z4eea5ecfe29e
Shows that in differential games with incomplete information, signals and private types are progressively revealed as the game proceeds.
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