This chapter considers how valuable scientific knowledge is, and how certain and permanent is the knowledge gained through this method. Peirce repeatedly and firmly asserts that scientific knowledge is not a completely certain and adequate representation of its object. Science never achieves the final and absolute formulation of the universe. Pierce calls the acknowledgment of this necessary limitation of scientific knowledge “fallibilism.” It is an attitude of reserve toward science, a deliberate withholding of a complete and final commitment toward the achievements of the scientific method. At the same time, there is a spirit of confidence in science, and an assurance that science really does converge on the truth. Peircean fallibilism, then, is not a complete distrust of scientific knowledge. Rather it is tempered by the reasoned conviction that scientific knowledge is the best knowledge we have, and that the method of the sciences is the only reliable method of settling opinion, hence why his attitude is considered a “moderate fallibilism.” This chapter considers the moderate fallibilism of science as a consequent of the method of the sciences, and of the object which the sciences study, namely, the universe.

se, as in the case of psychoanalytic theories, it is consistent with all possible observations, is unscientific. However, Popper is not a positivist and acknowledges that unscientific theories may be enlightening and that even purely mythogenic explanations have performed a valuable function in the past in expediting our understanding of the nature of reality. 3. The Problem of Demarcation For Popper the central problem in the philosophy of science is that of demarcation, i.e., of distinguishing between science and what he terms “non-science” (e.g., logic, metaphysics, psychoanalysis, and Adler’s individual psychology). Popper is unusual amongst contemporary philosophers in that he accepts the validity of the Humean critique of induction, and indeed, goes beyond it in arguing that induction is never actually used in science. However, he does not concede that this entails scepticism and argues that the Baconian/Newtonian insistence on the primacy of “pure” observation, as the initial step in the formation of theories, is completely misguided: all observation is selective and theory-laden and there are no pure or theory-free observations. In this way he destabilises the traditional view that science can be distinguished from non-science on the basis of its inductive methodology. In contradistinction to this, Popper holds that there is no unique methodology specific to science; rather, science, like virtually every other organic activity, consists largely of problem-solving. Popper accordingly rejects the view that induction is the characteristic method of scientific investigation and inference, substituting falsifiability in its place. It is easy, he argues, to obtain evidence in favour of virtually any theory, and he consequently holds that such “corroboration”, as he terms it, should count scientifically only if it is the positive result of a genuinely “risky” prediction, which might conceivably have been false.

Falsificationism: science without induction? | An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science | Cambridge Aspire website Skip to main content Accessibility help t d Internet Explorer 11 is being discontinued by Microsoft in August 2021. If you have difficulties viewing the site on Internet Explorer 11 we recommend using a different browser such as Microsoft Edge, Google Chrome, Apple Safari or Mozilla Firefox. X Cambridge Aspire homepage Search Cambridge Aspire homepage --- Institution Login Search > An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science > Falsificationism: science without induction? # An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science Chapter ## Chapter 2: Falsificationism: science without induction? pp. 15-25 Kent W. Staley , St Louis University, Missouri Share - Get access - Export citation - Add to bookmarks Add bookmark Export citation Share Overview ## Summary Growth through falsification The philosopher of science Karl Popper considered the problem of induction so grave as to require the elimination of induction from the methods employed in science. He went so far as to assert that “in my view there is no such thing as induction” (Popper, 1992, 40).