John Rawls has identified a principle which he calls ‘The Aristotelian Principle (Rawls, 1971: 427).’ Although it is not necessarily true for all people, generally we may say that most people will prefer to express in action those abilities which are more challenging to realize and that people will enjoy that expression even more, the more difficult that they are to realize. Furthermore they will find both respect for themselves and for others in a community of those who strive to develop such a challenging goal of advancing, for example, human knowledge of higher mathematics. This Aristotelian Principle is a general tendency of human nature which we can find in key aspects of the ethics of Mill and Kant. We can find the key points of the Aristotelian Principle in Mill’s conception of the moral community and the moral person. First, human beings prefer the higher pleasures rather than the lower pleasures. Second, among these higher pleasures we find especially the higher challenge of living the difficult and higher life of virtue for the sake of both others and the self. Just as Aristotle cannot prove that his Principle must be true, neither can Mill prove either of these two points he has affirmed. Kant’s consideration of the proposed action of failing to develop one’s talents allows us to see the Aristotelian Principle at work at the heart of Kant’s ethics because Kant undercuts his own a priori application of Humanity as an End-in-Itself because he sees no direct harm to humanity when one fails to develop one’s own talents. Consequently, in the ethics of both Kant and Mill, the Aristotelian Principle cannot be proven as an a priori principle, but is to be affirmed as a deeply felt preference rooted in human nature’s empirical desire to advance both self and others. Athens Journal of Humanities & Arts - Volume 2, Issue 1 – Pages 9-18 https://doi.org/10.30958/ajha.2-1-1 doi=10.30958/ajha.2-1-1 The Aristotelian Principle in Mill and Kant By William O’Meara John Rawls has identified a principle which he calls ‘The Aristotelian Principle (Rawls, 1971, p.427).’ Although it is not necessarily true for all people, generally we may say that most people will prefer to express in action those abilities which are more challenging to realize and that people will enjoy that expression even more, the more difficult that they are to realize. Furthermore they will find both respect for themselves and for oth ers in a community of those who strive to develop such a challenging goal of advancing, for example, human knowledge of higher mathematics. This Aristotelian Principle is a general tendency of human nature which we can find in key aspects of the ethics of Mill and Kant. We can find the key points of the Aristotelian Principle in Mill’s conception of the moral community and the moral person. First, human beings prefer the higher pleasures rather than the lower pleasures. Second, among these higher pleasures we find especially the higher challenge of living the difficult and higher life of virtue for the sake of both others and the self. Just as Aristotle cannot prove that his Principle must be true, neither can Mill prove either of these two points he has aff irmed. Kant’s consideration of the proposed action of failing to develop one’s talents allows us to see the Aristotelian Principle at work at the heart of Kant’s ethics because Kant undercuts his own a priori application of Humanity as an End -in-Itself bec ause he sees no direct harm to humanity when one fails to develop one’s own talents. Consequently, in the ethics of both Kant and Mill, the Aristotelian Principle cannot be proven as an a priori principle, but is to be affirmed as a deeply felt preference rooted in human nature’s empirical desire to advance both self and others. John Rawls has identified a principle implicit in Aristotle‟s analysis of human nature and behavior which he calls „The Aristotelian Principle (Rawls, 1971, p. 427).‟ This principl e of deep motivation affirms that „other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and [that] this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity ( Rawls, 1971, p.427).‟ Although it is not necessarily true for all people, generally we may say that most people will prefer to express in action those abilities which are more challenging to realize and that people will enjoy that expression even more, the more difficult that Professor, Department of Philosophy and Religion, James Madison University, USA. Vol. 2, No. 1 O'Meara: The Aristotelian Principle in Mill and Kant 14 perceptible degree present in all of us; but this, unhappil y, is a fact admitted by those who believe the most strenuously in their transcendental origin. Like the other acquired capacities above referred to, the moral faculty, if not a part of our nature, is a natural outgrowth from it; capable, like them, in a c ertain small degree, of springing up spontaneously; and susceptible of being brought by cultivation to a high degree of development. Unhappily it is also susceptible, by a sufficient use of the external sanctions and of the force of early impressions, of b eing cultivated in almost any direction: so that there is hardly anything so absurd or Vol. 2, No. 1 O'Meara: The Aristotelian Principle in Mill and Kant 18 Kerstein, S.J., 2009. Deriving the Supreme Principle of Morality from Common Moral Ideals. In: Th.E. Hill , Jr. (ed.), The Blackwell Gu ide to Kant’s Ethics . Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Mill, J.S., 1879. Utilitiarianism. London: Longman, Green, and Co. Available from: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/11224/11224-h/11224-h.htm. Rader, Melvin (1964), Ethics and the Human Community . New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Rawls, J ., 1971. A Theory of Justice . Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.