The huge fiscal expansions triggered by the corona crisis raised debt/GDP ratios to very high levels. This led some economists to reconsider the taboo on seignorage. Following a brief documentation of the crisis impact and aggregate demand policies responses the paper discusses views of academics and policymakers on seignorage. Optimal taxation considerations imply that the decision on allocating deficit financing between debt and seignorage falls within the realm of fiscal authorities-a fact that infringes on central bank (CB) autonomy. The paper explores ideas aimed at improving the tradeoff between those two principles. Implication of cross-country variations in the need to use seignorage is discussed. Comparison of the indirect contribution of quantitative easing (QE) to deficit financing with the direct contribution of seignorage implies that QE is a substitute to seignorage that preserves central bank dominance without much change in existing monetary institutions. Comparison of empirical evidence from the USA during the global financial crisis with the post-WWI German inflation supports the view that for countries experiencing deflationary pressure seignorage is more potent in moving inflation toward its target than QE. Given the current outlook temporary use of seignorage does not appear to involve a substantial risk of inflation. Comparison of empirical evidence from the USA during the global financial crisis with the post-WWI German inflation supports the view that for countries experiencing deflationary pressure seignorage is more potent in moving inflation toward its target than QE. Given the current outlook temporary use of seignorage does not appear to involve a substantial risk of inflation. Although under current institutions the CB has the sole authority to increase the monetary base, this is a task that is naturally within the realm of elected fiscal policymakers. This raises the following non-trivial dilemma: How to implement an efficient use of seignorage during serious emergencies without opening the spigot for monetary financing of fiscal deficits during normal times. The paper considers possible solutions to this dilemma and the associated risks including the, currently remote, risk of inflation and of upward unanchoring of inflationary expectations. Empirical evidence on the higher effectiveness of seignorage in raising inflation is provided by means of a comparison of substantial QE operations through base expansion practiced in the USA during the GFC with base expansion of the same size used for seignorage operations during part of the post-WWI German hyperinflation. This is followed by concluding remarks. Economic Impact of the Corona Crisis and the Response of Aggregate Demand Policies Unlike the GFC and the great depression the corona crisis originated in the real economy and was totally unanticipated. Reproduced from Yardeni Research Inc. ( 2021 ), February 15 Since the introduction of large scale asset purchases during the GFC CBs assets have generally been trending upward. But even against this background the acceleration in the trend during 2020 is a notable outlier. Seignorage and the Role of CBs: Past and Present Seignorage is the real value of goods and services that the seignorage recipient acquires with new money created by the CB. Deployment of Fiscal Policies during the Corona Crisis and Cross-Country Variations in the Need to Use Seignorage The supply and demand disruptions caused by the corona crisis have already prompted many governments to enact large fiscal packages designed to maintain the economy and the health system afloat in the face of workers’ confinements, persistent closures of businesses, and mass unemployment. The US 2.2 and 1.9 trillion fiscal package (about 20% of GDP) discussed in section " Economic Impact of the Corona Crisis and the Response of Aggregate Demand Policies " is one example. Interestingly, to this day the Fed still holds a substantial amount of assets created during the GFC and its aftermath. Just prior to the onset of the corona crisis the balance sheet of the Fed was in the vicinity of 4 trillion $. 15 Following the massive QE operations recently deployed in reaction to the shrinkage of economic activity due to the corona virus the balance sheet reached 7.4 trillion $ in January 2021 (Fig. 2 ). By extending QE operations to long-term maturities during the GFC the Fed managed to influence the level and slope of the yield curve. However, it is important to note that QE under the accord was dictated to the CB by the political authorities, whereas the modern QE operations are under the discretion of the CB. Should Seignorage be Used in View of the Current Inflation Outlook? Given current information (March 2021) it is not evident that the During 2020 it financed most of its 7% primary deficit by means of money creation for lack of other options such as debt relief (inflation was almost 54% in 2019 and 36% in 2020). But, for regions like the Eurozone (EZ) and Japan, in which deflation rather than inflation is a problem some temporary reliance on seignorage financing is desirable not only because of optimal taxation considerations but also because it can lift inflation toward the target more effectively than QE operations. The relative advantage of a $ of seignorage over a $ of QE is illustrated in Fig. During the early stages of the GFC Caballero ( 2010 ) proposed to use seignorage provided it is earmarked for public infrastructural investments. 12 However, in countries such as Japan and the Euro area with persistent deflations and underutilizations of capacity temporary use of seignorage may be indicated to revive economic activity and to lift inflation toward the target. 13 Currently the actual distribution of the ECB profits is based on the capital key that gives equal weights to GDP and population. 14 Admittedly, some of the interest payment may be refunded to government through profit transfer schemes.