This paper trials new experimental methods for the analysis of natural language reasoning and the (re)development of critical ordinary language philosophy in the wake of J.L. Austin. Philosophical arguments and thought experiments are strongly shaped by default pragmatic inferences, including stereotypical inferences. Austin suggested that contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences are at the root of some philosophical paradoxes and problems, and that these can be resolved by exposing those verbal fallacies. This paper builds on recent efforts to empirically document inappropriate stereotypical inferences that may drive philosophical arguments. We demonstrate that previously employed questionnaire-based output measures do not suffice to exclude relevant confounds. We then report an experiment that combines reading time measurements with plausibility ratings. The study seeks to provide evidence of inappropriate stereotypical inferences from appearance verbs that have been suggested to lie at the root of the influential ‘argument from illusion’. Our findings support a diagnostic reconstruction of this argument. They provide the missing component for proof of concept for an experimental implementation of critical ordinary language philosophy that is in line with the ambitions of current ‘evidential’ experimental philosophy.

Several important philosophical problems (including the problems of perception, free will, and scepticism) arise from antinomies that are developed through philosophical paradoxes. The critical strand of ordinary language philosophy (OLP), as practiced by J.L. Austin, provides an approach to such ‘antinomic problems’ that proceeds from an examination of ‘ordinary language’ (how people ordinarily talk about the phenomenon of interest) and ‘common sense’ (what they commonly think about it), and deploys findings to show that the problems at issue are artefacts of fallacious reasoning. The approach is capable, and in need of, empirical development. Proceeding from a case-study on Austin’s paradigmatic treatment of the problem of perception, this paper identifies the key empirical assumptions informing the approach, assesses them in the light of empirical findings about default inferences, contextualisation failures, and belief fragmentation, and explores how these findings can be deployed to address the problem of perception. This facilitates a novel resolution of the problem of perception. Proceeding from this paradigm, the paper proposes ‘experimental critical OLP’ as a new research program in experimental philosophy that avoids apparent non-sequiturs of OLP, extends and transforms experimental philosophy’s ‘sources program’, and provides a promising new strategy for deploying empirical findings about how people ordinarily talk and think about phenomena, to address longstanding philosophical problems.

experimented with treating philosophical problems about, for example, other minds, perception, or the external world as confusions that arise when ordinary expressions Ordinary language philosophy (OLP, sometimes called linguistic philosophy) is a methodological approach within analytic philosophy which treats many traditional philosophical problems as the result of misunderstandings of how words are ordinarily used. Rather than proposing ideal or artificial languages, ordinary language philosophers investigate the actual use of expressions in everyday contexts Ordinary language philosophy (OLP, sometimes called linguistic philosophy) is a methodological approach within analytic philosophy which treats many traditional philosophical problems as the result of misunderstandings of how words are ordinarily used. Rather than proposing ideal or artificial languages, ordinary language philosophers investigate the actual use of expressions in everyday contexts and often argue that once such uses are described carefully, many philosophical "problems" dissolve or change their shape. In the twentieth century OLP was primarily associated with the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, early to mid-century philosophers at the University of Cambridge such as G. E. Moore and John Wisdom, and mid-century philosophers at the University of Oxford, including Gilbert Ryle, J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson, H. L. A. Hart, and Paul Grice. Because a number of its most prominent practitioners taught at Oxford, OLP is sometimes informally referred to as "Oxford philosophy". The approach peaked in influence during the 1940s–1960s and then rapidly declined as more formal and scientific styles of analytic philosophy gained prominence. Since the late twentieth century, however, ordinary-language-inspired work has played a significant role in post-analytic philosophy, especially in the writings of Stanley Cavell, John Searle, and a number of feminist philosophers and literary theorists who have adapted ordinary language methods for social, ethical, and aesthetic questions. Recent work in the history of analytic philosophy and in experimental philosophy has also re-examined and in some cases revived aspects of the ordinary language tradition.

This thesis proposes and exemplifies a philosophical method for untangling moral confusions faced by teachers, specifically of students with social, emotional and mental health difficulties [SEMHD]. D. Z. Phillips (1979), following the philosophical approach of Ludwig Wittgenstein, believed that teachers generally command a clear view of moral value in education; that is, in any given situation, it is normally clear, or obvious to us what we ought to do. He, again following the lead of Wittgenstein, suggests that what we consider to be ethical or philosophical problems are just confusions caused by our inability to see the situation clearly. This thesis contends that such confusions arise because moral value has become hidden by a misplaced desire for foundational facts, or certainty. This desire is misplaced because moral value is absolute value, and this can only be shown and not said. Any belief that there are moral facts (in an absolute sense) is based on a philosophical illusion and results in various forms of dogmatism. Therefore, the recognition, or unhiding of moral value is a methodological issue, in that it requires us to develop a way of looking at problems that necessarily involves the virtues of being tentative, of recognising the incompleteness of our utterances, of humility. This methodological approach is best described by Simone Weil’s (1951, 2005) notion of paying attention, and it is work that needs to be undergone on one’s self. To respond to a situation c

Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition that views language and thought as tools for prediction, problem solving, and action, rather than describing, representing Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition that views language and thought as tools for prediction, problem solving, and action, rather than describing, representing, or mirroring reality. Pragmatists contend that most philosophical topics—such as the nature of knowledge, language, concepts, meaning, belief, and science—are best viewed in terms of their practical uses and successes. Pragmatism began Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition that views language and thought as tools for prediction, problem solving, and action, rather than describing, representing, or mirroring reality. Pragmatists contend that most philosophical topics—such as the nature of knowledge, language, concepts, meaning, belief, and science—are best viewed in terms of their practical uses and successes. Pragmatism began in the United States in the 1870s. Its origins are often attributed to philosophers Charles Sanders Peirce, William James…