When a measurement is compatible with each of two other measurements that are incompatible with one another, these define distinct contexts for the given measurement. The Kochen–Specker theorem rules out models of quantum theory that satisfy a particular assumption of context-independence: that sharp measurements are assigned outcomes both deterministically and independently of their context. This notion of noncontextuality is not suited to a direct experimental test because realistic measurements always have some degree of unsharpness due to noise. However, a generalized notion of noncontextuality has been proposed that is applicable to any experimental procedure, including unsharp measurements, but also preparations as well, and for which a quantum no-go result still holds. According to this notion, the model need only specify a probability distribution over the outcomes of a measurement in a context-independent way, rather than specifying a particular outcome. It also implies novel constraints of context-independence for the representation of preparations. In this article, we describe a general technique for translating proofs of the Kochen–Specker theorem into inequality constraints on realistic experimental statistics, the violation of which witnesses the impossibility of a noncontextual model. We focus on algebraic state-independent proofs, using the Peres–Mermin square as our illustrative example. Our technique yields the necessary and sufficient conditions for a particular set of correlations (between the preparations and the measurements) to admit a noncontextual model. The inequalities thus derived are demonstrably robust to noise. We specify how experimental data must be processed in order to achieve a test of these inequalities. We also provide a criticism of prior proposals for experimental tests of noncontextuality based on the Peres–Mermin square.

In this paper, I argue that the Shrapnel-Costa no-go theorem undermines the last remaining viability of the view that the fundamental ontology of quantum mechanics is essentially classical: that is, the view that physical reality is underpinned by objectively real, counterfactually definite, uniquely spatiotemporally defined, local, dynamical entities with determinate valued properties, and where typically 'quantum' behaviour emerges as a function of our own in-principle ignorance of such entities. Call this view Einstein-Bell realism. One can show that the causally symmetric local hidden variable approach to interpreting quantum theory is the most natural interpretation that follows from Einstein-Bell realism, where causal symmetry plays a significant role in circumventing the nonclassical consequences of the traditional no-go theorems. However, Shrapnel and Costa argue that exotic causal structures, such as causal symmetry, are incapable of explaining quantum behaviour as arising as a result of noncontextual ontological properties of the world. This is particularly worrying for Einstein-Bell realism and classical ontology. In the first instance, the obvious consequence of the theorem is a straightforward rejection of Einstein-Bell realism. However, more than this, I argue that, even where there looks to be a possibility of accounting for contextual ontic variables within a causally symmetric framework, the cost of such an account undermines a key advantage of causal symmetry: that accepting causal symmetry is more economical than rejecting a classical ontology. Either way, it looks like we should give up on classical ontology.