Universals such as humanity, redness, and mass are general entities instantiated by particulars. For example, Trudeau and Obama are particulars that instantiate the universal humanity just as stop signs and strawberries instantiate the universal redness. Universals are often held to occupy one or more of the theoretical roles associated with properties. Among other tasks, they are commonly thought to explain the similarities between distinct particulars and to serve as the meaning of expressions like ‘humanity’ and ‘being red’. Unlike trope theory, which rejects universals in favour of particularized property instances like the redness of this very apple or the humanity of Obama, universals are often described as ‘the one over the many’ as they are shared or had in common by distinct particulars. The division between particulars and universals is of both historical and contemporary significance. On one historically influential usage, nominalism is the thesis that reality is exhaustively particular. It therefore explicitly rejects general entities like universals. On a second and perhaps more contemporary usage, nominalism is the denial that there are any abstract entities such as numbers and propositions. Since universals are usually held to be abstract rather than concrete entities, proponents of universals and nominalists – regardless of how ‘nominalism’ is understood – typically stand opposed. Within contemporary metaphysics, there remains considerable disagreement about the nature of universals including their variety, structure, and the instantiation relation that ties universals to particulars. Note, also, that terminological complications abound in this area with some authors using ‘instantiation’ interchangeably with ‘exemplification’ or ‘characterization’ and others taking talk of ‘properties’, ‘qualities’, or ‘attributes’ to be synonymous with talk of ‘universals’. This latter practice often unhelpfully obscures important distinctions among competing views Universals - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Back to top Access to the full content is only available to members of institutions that have purchased access. If you belong to such an institution, please log in or find out more about how to order . Share Facebook Twitter Email Copy link Cite Cite close Loading content We were unable to load the content Print Contents Article Summary content locked 1. The case for universals content locked 2. The variety of universals content locked 3. Locating universals content locked 4. Structural universals content locked 5. Instantiating and individuating universals content locked Bibliography Thematic Universals By Cowling, Sam DOI 10.4324/9780415249126-N065-2 Versions content locked version 2 content unlocked version 1 Published 2019 DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-N065-2 Version: v2, Published online: 2019 Retrieved August 08, 2026, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/universals/v-2 Article Summary Universals such as humanity, redness , and mass are general entities instantiated by particulars. For example, Trudeau and Obama are particulars that instantiate the universal humanity just as stop signs and strawberries instantiate the universal redness . Universals are often held to occupy one or more of the theoretical roles associated with properties. Among other tasks, they are commonly thought to explain the similarities between distinct particulars and to serve as the meaning of expressions like ‘humanity’ and ‘being red’. Unlike trope theory, which rejects universals in favour of particularized property instances like the redness of this very apple or the humanity of Obama , universals are often described as ‘the one over the many’ as they are shared or had in common by distinct particulars. The division between particulars and universals is of both historical and contemporary significance. On one historically influential usage, nominalism is the thesis that reality is exhaustively particular. It therefore explicitly rejects general entities like universals. On a second and perhaps more contemporary usage, nominalism is the denial that there are any abstract entities such as numbers and propositions. Since universals are usually held to be abstract rather than concrete entities, proponents of universals and nominalists – regardless of how ‘nominalism’ is understood – typically stand opposed. Within contemporary metaphysics, there remains considerable disagreement about the nature of universals including their variety, structure, and the instantiation relation that ties universals to particulars. Note, also, that terminological complications abound in this area with some authors using ‘instantiation’ interchangeably with ‘exemplification’ or ‘characterization’ and others taking talk of ‘properties’, ‘qualities’, or ‘attributes’ to be synonymous with talk of ‘universals’. This latter practice often unhelpfully obscures important distinctions among competing views about properties. Share Facebook Twitter Email Copy link Cite Cite close Loading content We were unable to load the content Print Citing this article: Cowling, Sam. Universals, 2019, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-N065-2. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/universals/v-2. Copyright © 1998-2026 Routledge. Related Articles Properties By Daly, Chris Particulars By Maurin, Anna-Sofia Abstract objects By Hale, Bob Nominalism By Guigon, Ghislain