Multi-tasking performance drops are caused by attentional bottlenecks
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Peer-reviewed literature demonstrates that human multitasking performance suffers due to central attentional and processing bottlenecks that prevent parallel performance of mental operations.
Human information processing suffers from severe limitations in parallel processing. In particular, when required to respond to two stimuli in rapid succession, processing bottlenecks may appear at central and peripheral stages of task processing. Importantly, it has been suggested that executive functions are needed to resolve the interference arising at such bottlenecks. The aims of the present study were to test whether central attentional limitations (i.e., bottleneck at the decisional response selection stage) as well as peripheral limitations (i.e., bottleneck at response initiation) both demand executive functions located in the lateral prefrontal cortex. For this, we re-analyzed two previous studies, in which a total of 33 participants performed a dual-task according to the paradigm of the psychological refractory period (PRP) during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). In one study (N = 17), the PRP task consisted of two two-choice response tasks known to suffer from a central bottleneck (CB group). In the other study (N = 16), the PRP task consisted of two simple-response tasks known to suffer from a peripheral bottleneck (PB group). Both groups showed considerable dual-task costs in form of slowing of the second response in the dual-task (PRP effect). Imaging results are based on the subtraction of both single-tasks from the dual-task within each group. In the CB group, the bilateral middle frontal gyri and inferior frontal gyri were activated. Higher activation in these areas was associated with lower dual-task costs. In the PB group, the right middle frontal and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) were activated. Here, higher activation was associated with higher dual-task costs. In conclusion we suggest that central and peripheral bottlenecks both demand executive functions located in lateral prefrontal cortices (LPFC). Differences between the CB and PB groups with respect to the exact prefrontal areas activated and the correlational patterns suggest that the executive functions resolving interference at least partially differ between the groups.
Human multitasking suffers from a central attentional bottleneck preventing parallel performance of central mental operations, leading to profound deferments in task performance. While previous research assumed that the deferment is caused by a mere waiting time (refractory period), we show that the bottleneck requires executive functions (EF; active scheduling account) accounting for a profound part of the deferment. Three participant groups with EF impairments (dyslexics, highly neurotics, deprived smokers) showed worse multitasking performance than respective control groups. Three further groups with EF improvements (video-gamers, bilinguals, coffee consumers) showed improved multitasking. Finally, three groups performed a dual-task and different measures of EF (reading span, rotation span, symmetry span) and showed significant correlations between multitasking performance and working memory capacity. Demands on EF during multitasking may cause more errors, mental fatigue and stress, with parts of the population being considerably more prone to this.
Cognitive impairment after stroke is heterogeneous: there is no strict correspondence between brain damage and magnitude of deficit or recovery. Protective factors such as cognitive or brain reserve have been invoked to explain the mismatch. Here, we consider the opposite point of view: the instances in which this protection is overturned. We leveraged on multitasking to stress the brain's processing limits and unveil deficits that may be missed by standard testing in a sample of 46 patients with unilateral subacute to chronic stroke and no sign of lateralized spatial-attentional disorders at neuropsychological paper-and-pencil tests. Multivariate analyses identified a phenotype of patients with high susceptibility to multitasking, showing stark contralesional spatial awareness deficit only when multitasking. Multivariate brain-behavior mapping based on lesions location and structural disconnections pointed to the Multiple-Demand System, a network of frontal and fronto-parietal areas subserving domain-general processes. Damage in this network may critically interact with domain-specific processes, resulting in subtle and yet invalidating deficits. Indeed, these patients (one-third of the sample) presented worse performance in tests evaluating activities of daily living and domain-general abilities. We conclude that the theoretical construct of susceptibility to multitasking helps understanding what marks the passage to clinically visible deficits after brain damage.
Making two responses to a single object: implications for the central attentional bottleneck.
Experiments with two stimuli and two responses have revealed a central attentional bottleneck and pointed to response selection as its primary locus; however, little has been said about the underlying reasons for this bottleneck. Here we explore these reasons. In the first three experiments, Ss made two separate responses to different aspects of the same object. Interference between selection of the responses persisted, ruling out the possibility that the dual-task bottleneck is caused by the input to the response-selection mechanism being limited to one object at a time. The next four experiments examined what happens when two responses are made to the same attribute of a single object. These experiments show that only one response selection occurred. Hence, the central mechanism is not limited to picking one motor action at a time. Several possible theories about the nature of the bottleneck are discussed.
Published in Journal of experimental psychology. Human perception and performance (1992)
Shifting visual attention and selecting motor responses: distinct attentional mechanisms.
Does shifting visual attention require the same central mechanism as that required for selecting overt motor responses? In Experiment 1, Ss performed 2 tasks: a speeded manual response to a tone and an unspeeded report of a cued target letter in a brief masked array. Stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between tone and array was varied. If the attention shift to the target was delayed by the first task, then there should be more second-task errors at short SOAs and on trials with slow first-task responses. In fact, SOA effects and dependencies were minimal. Results were unchanged in further experiments in which the relation between cue and target was symbolic, spatially "unnatural," or based on the color of the target. Two additional experiments validated key assumptions of the method. The results confirm that although selection of motor responses constitutes a processing bottleneck, the control of visual attention operates independently of this bottleneck.
Published in Journal of experimental psychology. Human perception and performance (1991)
Cognitive control is applied in situations that require overriding a habitual and automatic response. The conflict monitoring hypothesis and the Expected Value of Control (EVC) theory as its extension posit a control system responsible for detecting conflicting occasions and adapting to them dynamically within a task. Here we evaluate this prediction in two versions of one of the most popular tasks in cognitive control, namely the Stroop task. We hypothesized that nearby-items interference combines with task interference in the multi-item version effectively turning it into a multi-task that may challenge cognitive control. Adopting an alternative methodology tracking within-task performance, we compared the classical multi-item version of the Stroop task and its single-item counterpart in adults and children. The results revealed a within-task performance decline only in the multi-item version of the task, in both incongruent and neutral conditions, modulated by the presumed maturity of the control system. These findings suggest capacity constraints in control implementation and allocation under conditions requiring parallel execution of multiple cognitive tasks. Task complexity and demands seem to modulate effects on performance. We discuss implications for cognitive control as well as substantial concerns regarding the calculation and use of indices of interference based on the commonly used multi-item version of the Stroop task.
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