Morality is fundamentally subjective according to Hume's moral philosophy
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Historical and philosophical sources establish that David Hume's moral philosophy is grounded in moral sentimentalism, which maintains that ethics are derived from human emotion, sentiment, and mental perceptions rather than objective rational principles.
A Treatise of Human Nature
A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects (1739–40) is a book by Scottish philosopher David Hume. Many consider it one of his most important books or one of the most important books in all of philosophy.[1]
References
- ↑ The book has appeared in many editions after the death of the author. See Hume, David (1888). Selby-Bigge, L.A. (ed.). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Retrieved 30 June 2014. via Archive.org; Hume, David (1882). Green, T.H.; Grose, T.H. (eds.). A Treatise of Human Nature : Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects & Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Vol. 1. London: Longmans, Green & Co.; Hume, David (1882). Green, T.H.; Grose, T.H. (eds.). A Treatise of Human Nature : Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects & Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Vol. 2. London: Longmans, Green & Co. Retrieved 30 June 2014. via Archive.org
A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects (1739–40) is a book by Scottish philosopher David Hume, considered by many to be Hume's most important work and one of the most influential works in the history of philosophy. The book has appeared in many editions since the death of the author in 1776. The Treatise is a classic statement of philosophical empiricism, scepticism, and naturalism. In the introduction Hume presents the idea of placing all science and philosophy on a novel foundation: namely, an empirical investigation into human nature.
Hume defends a sentimentalist account of morality, arguing that ethics is based on sentiment and the passions rather than reason, and famously declaring that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions." Hume also offers a sceptical theory of personal identity and a compatibilist account of free will. Isaiah Berlin wrote of Hume that "no man has influenced the history of philosophy to a deeper or more disturbing degree". Jerry Fodor wrote of Hume's Treatise that it is "the foundational document of cognitive science".
Regarding An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume said it is "of all my writings, historical, philosophical, or literary, incomparably the best". == Content == === Introduction === Hume's introduction presents the idea of placing all science and philosophy on a novel foundation: namely, an empirical investigation into human psychology. He begins by acknowledging "that common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings [i.e., any complicated and difficult argumentation]", a prejudice formed in reaction to "the present imperfect condition of the sciences" (including the endless scholarly disputes and the inordinate influence of "eloquence" over reason).
But since, according to Book 1, physical necessity is nothing more than constant conjunction and the causal inferences drawn by the human mind, the issue then comes down to this: is there a regular correspondence between human action and human psychology, and do we base causal inferences upon such regularities? Hume thinks the answer to both questions is obviously in the affirmative: the uniformity found in the world of human affairs is comparable to that found in the natural world, and the inferences we base on "moral evidence" (concerning human psychology and action) are comparable to the inferences we base on natural evidence (concerning physical objects).
Thus, we end up convinced that we really could have acted differently, even though "a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character". Finally, we mistakenly think necessity poses a threat to moral responsibility, and is therefore "dangerous... to religion and morality". After noting that being dangerous is not the same as being false, Hume recalls that his "necessity" is a very attenuated one: there is nothing dangerous or even controversial about saying that constant conjunction and causal inference apply to human action as well as physical objects.
Consider the immorality of parricide and incest: this cannot consist merely in the abstract relations at play, for the very same relations can be found in perfectly non-moral contexts involving inanimate objects and animals. And as for probable reasoning, Hume famously contends that we observe nothing in an action besides its ordinary non-moral qualities—experience reveals no moral qualities unless one looks to the moral feelings in one's own mind, so that virtue and vice are (like the secondary qualities of modern philosophy) "not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind". This first section ends with the famous is-ought paragraph.
Hume is thus left endorsing a moral sentimentalism somewhat like that of Hutcheson: "Morality... is more properly felt than judg'd of". The moral evaluations in our mind are impressions—"nothing but particular pains or pleasures"—and Hume's task is to explain how certain kinds of "action, or sentiment, or character" produce these special moral sentiments in us. But a problem arises: since pleasant or painful feelings can be produced by inanimate objects, why does sentimentalism not succumb to the same objection Hume has just raised against rationalism?
And thus public opinion ("perfectly infallible" in questions of morality) is not wed to any exceptionless rule of "passive obedience", but is perfectly willing to "make allowances for resistance in the more flagrant instances of tyranny and oppression". The next problem of allegiance is who exactly is the rightful ruler? And according to Hume, such questions are often irresolvable by reason, and it can be wise to simply go with the flow in the "interests of peace and liberty". Again, Hume agrees that political society begins with a social agreement promising allegiance to certain people.
David Hume’s views on aesthetic theory and the philosophy of art are to be found in his work on moral theory ... the capacity to produce art. To summarize Hume on taste, aesthetic and moral response is “immediate” ... preferable to the rash prejudices of the vulgar, Hume is content that moral sense assigns approbation to the ...
Abstract
This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of the Scottish empiricist philosopher David Hume (1711–76). The view that Hume’s ethics is purely anthropological or descriptive is criticized. Hume’s deontological ethics of action is compared with his utilitarian ethics of motive. It is shown that his utilitarianism is a view about rather than within morality: morality itself is a device for the promotion of happiness, so that non-utilitarian or deontological moral views may be conceptually confused. Hume’s conception of impartiality is explained, and finally his dualism of the practical reason, which allows for the rationality of self-sacrifice as well as that of immorality, depending on circumstances.
David Hume (; born David Home; 7 May 1711 – 25 August 1776) was a Scottish philosopher, historian, economist and essayist who is known for his highly influential system of empiricism, philosophical scepticism and metaphysical naturalism. Beginning with A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40), Hume strove to create a naturalistic science of man that examined the psychological basis of human nature. Fo
Hume's moral sentimentalism was shared by his close friend Adam Smith, and the two were mutually influenced by the moral reflections of their older contemporary, Francis Hutcheson. Peter Singer claims that Hume's argument that morals cannot have a rational basis alone "would have been enough to earn him a place in the history of ethics."
Hume also put forward the is–ought problem, later known as Hume's Law, denying the possibility of logically deriving what ought to be from what is. According to the Treatise (1740), in every system of morality that Hume has read, the author begins by stating facts about the world as it is but always ends up suddenly referring to what ought to be the case. Hume demands that a reason should be given for inferring what ought to be the case, from what is the case. This is because it "seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others."
Hume's theory of ethics has been influential in modern-day meta-ethical theory, helping to inspire emotivism, and ethical expressivism and non-cognitivism, as well as Allan Gibbard's general theory of moral judgement and judgements of rationality.
Hume expressed his economic views in his Political Discourses, which were incorporated in Essays and Treatises as Part II of Essays, Moral and Political. To what extent he was influenced by Adam Smith is difficult to assess; however, both of them had similar principles supported from historical events. At the same time, Hume did not demonstrate the concrete system of economic theory which could be observed in Smith's Wealth of Nation
An opponent of philosophical rationalists, Hume held that passions rather than reason govern human behaviour, proclaiming that "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions." Hume was also a sentimentalist who held that ethics are based on emotion or sentiment rather than abstract moral principle. He maintained an early commitment to naturalistic explanations of moral phenomena and is usually accepted by historians of European philosophy to have first clearly expounded the is–ought problem, or the idea that a statement of fact alone can never give rise to a normative conclusion of what ought to be done.
As he did not recount what this scene exactly was, commentators have offered a variety of speculations. One prominent interpretation among contemporary Humean scholarship is that this new "scene of thought" was Hume's realisation that Francis Hutcheson's theory of moral sense could be applied to the understanding of morality as well. From this inspiration, Hume set out to spend a minimum of 10 years reading and writing. He soon came to the verge of a mental breakdown, first starting with a coldness—which he attributed to a "Laziness of Temper"—that lasted about nine months.
This work contained the same ideas, but with a shorter and clearer explanation. Although there has been some academic speculation as to the pamphlet's true author, it is generally regarded as Hume's creation. === 1740s === The Essays Moral and Political was published in 1741, included in the later edition as Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. In 1745, Hume applied for the Chair of Pneumatics and Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. However, the position was given to William Cleghorn after Edinburgh ministers petitioned the town council not to appoint Hume because he was seen as an atheist.
Hume is mainly considered an anti-rationalist, denying the possibility for practical reason, although other philosophers such as Christine Korsgaard, Jean Hampton and Elijah Millgram claim that Hume is not so much of an anti-rationalist as he is just a sceptic of practical reason. Hume denied the existence of practical reason as a principle because he claimed reason does not have any effect on morality, since morality is capable of producing effects in people that reason alone cannot create. As Hume explains in A Treatise of Human Nature (1740): Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular.
Hume's moral sentimentalism was shared by his close friend Adam Smith, and the two were mutually influenced by the moral reflections of their older contemporary, Francis Hutcheson. Peter Singer claims that Hume's argument that morals cannot have a rational basis alone "would have been enough to earn him a place in the history of ethics." Hume also put forward the is–ought problem, later known as Hume's Law, denying the possibility of logically deriving what ought to be from what is. According to the Treatise (1740), in every system of morality that Hume has read, the author begins by stating facts about the world as it is but always ends up suddenly referring to what ought to be the case.
Second, Hume has a theory of causation which fits in with the Chicago-school "black box" approach. According to Hume, cause and effect are related only through correlation. Hume shared the belief with modern monetarists that
Of Miracles, section X of the Enquiry, was often published separately. 1751. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. A reworking of material on morality from Book 3 of the Treatise, but with a significantly different emphasis. It "was thought by Hume to be the best of his writings." 1752. Political Discourses (part II of Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary within the larger Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, vol. 1). Included in Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects (1753–56) reprinted 1758–77. 1752–1758. Political Discourses/Discours politiques 1757.
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