A common interpretation of wakeful, nondestructive mind uploading is that the person with the postoperative original body exclusively persists the preoperative identity and that the person with the upload's body is some sort of identity copy. A frequent argument supporting this claim is that the preoperative person's stream of consciousness attaches exclusively to the postoperative person with the original body. By implication, the person with the upload's body spawns a new stream of consciousness, implying copy identity status. I argue that this is not the best metaphysical model of what happens in nondestructive uploading in the context of a stream of consciousness interpretation, and defend an alternative model which has generally received little attention in the existing literature: the branching identity model. Common phrasings of the conjecture often describe the goal of mind uploading as transferring a person’s neurological, psychological, and metaphysical traits from a brain to an upload’s physical receptacle [Corabi, J. & Schneider 2012; Shermer 2017], some futuristic computer that implements neural functions, or perhaps an ostensible biological clone if the reader prefers such scenarios. I do not conceive of identity as a physical concept that subscribes to physical properties however, such as spatial location or movement. The entire thought experiment was a nonstarter based on the general description’ s ingrained biases and consequent circular phrasing. Here’s what the general description might look like if we remove the circular logic but attempt to maintain its biased favoring of the original body over the upload: General Description: If you undergo wakeful, nondestructive mind uploading, you will not experience a shift in perspective over to the upload. Others potentially commit serious category errors regarding the fundamental properties of abstract identity (e.g., spatio- temporal identity with its imposition of physical traits of location and movement, as explained earlier). These other models are not the thrust of the general description and its intended defense of the conjecture, so their implications for mind uploading will have to be left to other writings. This article only considers Wiley, K. B. Nondestructive Mind Uploading and the Stream of Consciousness, Sep 2023. So, when our senses mislead us into believing we haven’t changed location when, in fact, we have, our identity survives the experience nonetheless. Conclusion two: the preservation of our identity cannot depend on Wiley, K. B. Nondestructive Mind Uploading and the Stream of Consciousness, Sep 2023. 5 Nondestructive Mind Uploading and the Stream of Consciousness Wiley, Sep 2023 our having an accurate perception or understanding of our location based on the presumed location evidenced by our senses. Perhaps sleep is the confounding factor. 7 Nondestructive Mind Uploading and the Stream of Consciousness Wiley, Sep 2023 inner stream will be equally continuous between both postoperative people, and therefore there is no discontinuity that would support the conjecture. A likely counterargument is that while our visual experience is not indicative of our identity, either our set of atoms (classical body identity), or our closest continuer (see above), or the smooth spatial motion of our bodies (spatio-temporal identity) is the proper indicator we are seeking, as briefly introduced earlier. But the general description is an argument based entirely on stream of consciousness identity. One interpretation of such medical cases is that the brain’s primary role in producing psychological and cognitive traits, and in generating consciousness, derives not from action potential propagation, but rather from some entirely different aspect of neurology, one that apparently remains intact at frigid temperatures so as to maintain the physical features required to support metaphysical identity. In this way, the conjecture would remain valid, with the purported stream of consciousness persisting in association Wiley, K. B. Nondestructive Mind Uploading and the Stream of Consciousness, Sep 2023. One might counter, “Okay, good, that’s how we know when someone is preserved or a copy”, but what physical test or scan during or after mind uploading will uncover this temperature threshold that corresponds to metaphysical identity erasure and replacement, if not that of the paradigmatic action potential? Or is there a psychological test, some sort of cognitive interview, that would confirm or deny that identity has been preserved? We already know the answers to these questions. The premise of the thought experiments render such tests impossible. We expect no difference in outward behavior between the various postoperative people. For a thorough analysis of piecemeal replacement in the context of mind uploading, please see [Wiley 2016]. Another early objection was that the characterization of a mitosis is incorrect because of admitted body identity disparities. But I think it is correct after all. The physical bodies correspond to labels of original and copy; one physical token is an older pattern-arrangement of atoms than the other token. But the psychological metaphysical properties involved (conscious reflection on one’s memories as well as on the specious present), have undergone metaphysical mitosis with no notion of original and copy. Finally, after dismissing the general description of experiencing wakeful, nondestructive mind uploading, which was used to support the conjecture based on a stream of consciousness identity model, and consequently after dismissing the conjecture itself, I then offered an alternative theory of personal identity, called branching psychological identity, and illustrated how that model would interpret such a scenario through the respective experiences of the various people involved at various points in time throughout the procedure.