Memories and thoughts transfer with the brain during a brain transplantation
the verdict
INSUFFICIENT LEANING
refutedsupported
the weight of evidence
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Theoretical and philosophical literature suggests that psychological continuity, memories, and personal identity would remain with the brain donor in a hypothetical brain transplant, though empirical validation in humans is lacking.
Brain transplant
A human brain in a jar.
A brain transplant, brain cell transplant, or whole-body transplant is a procedure in which the brain of one organism is transplanted into the body of another organism. It is a procedure distinct from head transplantation, which involves transferring the entire head to a new body, as opposed to the brain only. Theoretically, a person with complete organ failure could be given a new and functional body while keeping their own personality, memories, and consciousness through such a procedure. Neurosurgeon Robert J. White has grafted the head of a monkey onto the headless body of another monkey. Electroencephalography(EEG) readings showed the brain was later functioning normally. Initially, it was thought to prove that the brain was an immunologically privileged organ, as the host's immune system did not attack it at first, but immune rejection caused the monkey to die after nine days.
## Existing challenges
Cross section view of nerve tissue.
One of the most significant barriers to the procedure is the inability of nerve tissue to heal properly; scarred nerve tissue does not transmit signals well, which is why spinal cord injuries devasta
a dualistic stance with regard to the mind/brain–body proper relationship. 1 In contrast to animalist theories, these philosophers believe that what matters in personal identity is psychological rather than bodily continuity. Besides, more or less implicitly assuming that the mind is lodged in the brain and does not significantly involve the body proper, psychological theorists claim that, were somebody's brain transplanted in somebody else's body, the resulting person would be the head/brain donor. This is, for instance, the opinion held by Sydney Shoemaker's, who wrote about hypothetical brain transplants in his 1963 book Self‐Knowledge and Self‐Identity , concluding that the criterion of personal identity is the continuity of one's own memories (or quasi‐memories, that is, in the transplant case, memories of actions which one's new body has never performed) 36 , 37 .
Similar, yet perhaps more complicated, is Derek Parfit's theory. Parfit believes that “a person is an entity that is distinct from his brain or body,” although it involves the existence of both 38 . Personal identity would hence concern the persistence of both brain and body and, in particular, it would require the preservation of one's psychological continuity. That being said, Parfit continues, personal identity is not what matters in survival 38 . On the contrary, what matters in survival is psychological continuity alone. In other words, in the hypothetical case that somebody's brain were transplanted into somebody else's body, the resulting person would be continuous with the head donor: “[i]f all of my brain continues both to exist and to be the brain of one living person, who is psychologically continuous with me, I continue to exist” 38 , 39 . Personal Identity Reconsidered
Once stripped bare of its most rigorous and analytic demonstrative apparatus, Parfit's theory might seem slightly sophistical. However, these and similar doubts might be intrinsic to the purely theoretical nature of both P
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