Majority rule voting is intransitive in certain preference configurations
Evidence establishes that under specific preference configurations (known as the Condorcet paradox), majority rule voting can yield cyclic and thus intransitive collective preferences.
Judged against reference works: claims of this kind are settled by reference works, not journal abstracts.
en.wikipedia.org: Condorcet paradox. en.wikipedia.org. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_paradox
Condorcet's paradox shows majority rule can produce cyclic, intransitive collective preferences like rock-paper-scissors.
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link.springer.com: From Condorcet’s paradox to Arrow: yet another simple proof of the impossibility theorem | Social Choice and Welfare | Springer Nature Link. link.springer.com. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-024-01557-8
Shows specific preference profiles lead to contradictions under majority-based pairwise comparison.
doi.org: Implicit Intransitivity Under Majority Rule with Mixed Motions. doi.org. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.26.3.312
Discusses situations that become intransitive under the majority voting rule.
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