--> Kant’s Transcendental Idealism > Allison on Transcendental Realism and Transcendental Idealism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Menu Browse Table of Contents What's New Random Entry Chronological Archives About Editorial Information About the SEP Editorial Board How to Cite the SEP Special Characters Advanced Tools Contact Support SEP Support the SEP PDFs for SEP Friends Make a Donation SEPIA for Libraries Entry Navigation Back to Entry Entry Contents Entry Bibliography Academic Tools Friends PDF Preview Author and Citation Info Back to Top Supplement to Kant’s Transcendental Idealism Allison on Transcendental Realism and Transcendental Idealism Allison (2004) puts this “epistemic” interpretation in the context of a larger interpretation of transcendental idealism as a “meta-philosophical” position. Allison’s idea is that, since Kant seems to regard transcendental idealism and “transcendental realism” as not only exclusive but exhaustive philosophical options, he must mean something very general by transcendental realism. Consequently, Allison argues, transcendental realists include not only the obvious suspects (e.g., Wolff, Locke) but (more surprisingly) also Hume and Berkeley. [ 69 ] Transcendental realism, as Allison characterizes it, is not a discrete, statable thesis, but something more like what the later Wittgenstein would call a “picture” to which pre-Kantian philosophy was captive. Transcendental idealism, therefore, is not a discrete, statable thesis either, but consists in freeing us from this “picture”. Transcendental idealism is nothing less than a complete revolution in our conception of what knowledge and philosophy are, an “ Umänderung der Denkart ” as Kant describes it in the B Preface (Bxvi). Allison characterizes the transcendental realist “picture” in at least three ways, and it is not obvious that