Literature exists examining the relationship between moral responsibility and probability
the verdict
SUPPORTED
the evidence backs this
refutedsupported
the weight of evidence
2 sources for · 0 against
Peer-reviewed philosophical literature discusses the application of probabilistic reasoning frameworks, such as the Condorcet Jury Theorem, to questions concerning moral responsibility and determinism.
Abstract
Can experimental philosophy help us answer central questions about the nature of moral responsibility, such as the question of whether moral responsibility is compatible with determinism? According to reasoning behind the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT), it might: If individual judges independently track the truth with even modest reliability, this reliability can quickly aggregate as the number of judges goes up. This chapter asks whether preconditions for such aggregation hold with respect to folk attributions of responsibility to deterministic scenarios, and whether it has consequences for philosophical method. Section 1 introduces the basic assumptions behind the CJT. Section 2 looks at the distribution of responsibility attributions in recent empirical studies. Section 3 looks at evidence concerning folk reliability, including evidence supporting two error theories for folk compatibilism—the No Matter What and Indeterminist Intrusion hypotheses—and one error theory for folk incompatiblism—the Bypassing hypotheses. It is argued that data undermines the first two error theories and suggests that only a limited class of judgments are subject to the third. Section 4 explains how conditional error theories can change the support of a position without begging the question. Section 5 asks whether the intricacies of the compatibilism question should lead us to deny that the folk are even modestly reliable in their judgments. Section 6 suggests that even if they are, their judgments will often not be independent enough to add much to the judgments of professional philosophers. Section 7 concludes.
necessary for moral responsibility, or (c) be the ultimate source or originator of their actions. There are different theories as to its nature, and these aspects
Free will is generally understood as the capacity or ability of people to (a) choose between different possible courses of action, (b) exercise control over their actions in a way that is necessary for moral responsibility, or (c) be the ultimate source or originator of their actions. There are different theories as to its nature, and these aspects are often emphasized differently depending on phi
Free will is generally understood as the capacity or ability of people to (a) choose between different possible courses of action, (b) exercise control over their actions in a way that is necessary for moral responsibility, or (c) be the ultimate source or originator of their actions. There are different theories as to its nature, and these aspects are often emphasized differently depending on philosophical tradition, with debates focusing on whether and how such freedom can coexist with physical determinism, divine foreknowledge, and other constraints.
Free will is closely linked to the concepts of moral responsibility and moral desert, praise, culpability, and other judgements that can logically apply only to actions that are freely chosen. It is also connected with the concepts of advice, persuasion, deliberation, and prohibition. Traditionally, only actions that are freely willed are seen as deserving credit or blame. Whether free will exists and the implications of whether it exists or not constitute some of the longest-running debates of philosophy.
Some philosophers and thinkers conceive of free will as the capacity to make choices undetermined by past events. However, determinism suggests that the natural world is governed by cause-and-effect relationships, and only one course of events is possible, which is inconsistent with a libertarian model of free will. Ancient Greek philosophy identified this issue, which remains a major focus of philosophical debate to this day. The view that posits free will as incompatible with determinism is called incompatibilism and encompasses both metaphysical libertarianism (the claim that determinism is false and thus free will is at least possible) and hard determinism or hard incompatibilism (the claim that determinism is true and thus free will is not possible). Another incompatibilist position is illusionism or hard incompatibilism, which holds not only determinism but also indeterminism (randomness) to be incompatible with free will and thus free will to be impossible regardless of the metaphysical truth of determinism.
In contrast, compatibilists hold that free will is compatible with determinism. Some…
Everything we examined (2)
This check searched the claim as stated. It did not run a separate search for evidence against it.