Kantian ethics prohibits lying even to a murderer seeking the lives of one's children.
the verdict
INSUFFICIENT LEANING
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3 sources for · 0 against
The retrieved sources reference Kantian absolutism against lying and his essay on the supposed right to lie, but do not provide full textual proof detailing the murderer-at-the-door scenario involving children.
This chapter considers some issues about our individual duties of sincerity and promissory fidelity, with particular emphasis on the role the stricture on lying plays in maintaining reliable channels of communication between moral agents. It defends a qualified absolutism about lying that distinguishes the wrong of the lie from the wrong involved in deception (when it is wrong). In particular, it examines Immanuel Kant's absolutism about lying, building upon the themes Kant adduces in the opening passage of the selection from the Lectures on Ethics. It also explores the problem of the Murderer at the Door and connects it to other issues about our moral relations with wrongdoers and the process of their moral evolution. Finally, it looks at the active, affimative misrepresentation that one is telling the truth rather than operating in a suspended context and relates it to the basic conditions of interpersonal moral agency.
Kant on Lies, Candour and Reticence | Kantian Review | Cambridge Core
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# Kant on Lies, Candour and Reticence
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 March 2011
James Edwin Mahon
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## Extract
Like several prominent moral philosophers before him, such as St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas, Kant held that it is never morally permissible to tell a lie. Although a great deal has been written on why and how he argued for this conclusion, comparatively little has been written on what, precisely, Kant considered a lie to be, and on how he differentiated between being truthful and being candid, between telling a lie and being reticent, and between telling a lie and other
Kant and the Supposed Right to Lie
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Digital US$32.99 Hardback Available Paperback Available
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 18 July 2025 28 August 2025
ISBN: 9781108992435 9781108834216 9781108994699
Dimensions: (229 x 152 mm)
Weight & Pages: 0.504kg, 240 Pages
Dimensions: (229 x 152 mm)
Weight & Pages: 238 Pages
Subjects: Eighteenth-Century Philosophy, Philosophy
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Subjects: Eighteenth-Century Philosophy, Philosophy
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### Book description
In his 1797 essay 'On a Supposed
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