ed from all forms of sensible intuition, in other words, empty space-nullified time. We think that this is the „pure synthesis of representations,‟ which is to take place with the unity necessary for pure synthesis, which consists „solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity‟ (A79)” (YAMAMOTO 2016: 87-100). Here, “the representation of this necessary synthetic unity” (A79) is commensurate with “i 2 = -1.” In regard to the issue of “numerical difference of the object (of the senses) itself” (B319), we have already said, “Instead of Kant, we have to say, „a number – quantum continuum – is homogeneous with the appearance itself, and appears to be homogeneous with the multiplicity, insofar as thing in itself – space-time itself – appears as quantum discretum.‟ We comprehend, through empirical intuition and synthesis – „the apprehension of the intuition‟ (A143) – that upon the entire cessation of movement of the standing and lasting I, number and magnitude emerges as quantum continuum, while during its movement, number and magnitude appear as quantum discretum. Therefore, it can be said The Real, the Infinite, Categories, and Cardinal Numbers: The Problem of Metaphysics in the Critique of When Kant makes a discourse in regard to categories, saying, “We cannot think any object except through categories; we cannot cognize any object that is thought except through intuitions that correspond to those concepts. Now all our intuitions are sensible, and this cognition, so far as its object is given, is empirical. Empirical cognition, however, is experience. Consequently no a priori cognition is possible for us except solely of objects of possible experience” (B165-B166), we should like to put it in another way, “We can think any object through categories; we can cognize any object that is thought through intuitions that correspond to those concepts. Now all our intuitions are sensible, and this cognition, so far as its object is given, is empirical. Empirical cognition, however, is experience. Consequently a priori cognition is possible for us solely of objects of possible experience .” What does “objects of possible experience” mean in this context? It is nothing but the category, i.e., nullity in space-time, or categories, i.e., filled space -elapsing time, which are grounded in “synthetic a priori cognition” (A14/B28). When we acknow ledge, in this regard, that the “categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances ” (B163), it becomes possible for us to reach the abyss of causality through transcendental analytic. Consciousness, which is to be immediately marked by death itself, could perceive a modification of its state through sensation and intuition, which accompany another‟s experienc e of death itself and cognize it as nullity in space -time, which is understood to be common to all consciousnesses. While nullity in space-time is cognized through sensibility, thereby being empirical, death itself is a pure concept , which is perceived fro m nullity in space -time and the synthesis of apprehension. The pure concept, insofar as it has its origin in the understanding and in a pure image of sensibility, does not go beyond the possibility of experience. When “sensation in itself” corresponds to the intensive magnitude in appearance or “the intensive magnitude in different appearances” (A173) – “possibility itself” or “possibility a priori” – “all objects of perception,” i.e., “objects of experience” could arise through “the logical functions for judgment,” i.e., the “very functions for judging, insofar as The Real, the Infinite, Cate gories, and Cardinal Numbers: The Problem of Metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason International Journal of Humanities Social Sciences and Education (IJHSSE) Page | 28 “sensation in itself” is determined with regard to the “possibility itself” or “possibility a priori .” Therefore, we would say that “all objects of perception,” i.e., “objects of experience” are called phaenomena, “to the extent that as objects they are thought in accordance with the unity of the categories.” When Kant makes a discourse in regard to “the sche ma of each category (A145), saying “the schema of each category contains and makes representable: in the case of magnitude, the generation (synthesis) of time itself, in the successive apprehension of an object” (A145), we think that the enigmatic remark indicates that 1) the “pure schema of magnitude (quantitatis)” (B182) – number – is commensurate with “the manifold for an empirical intuition” (B144) – a filled space-elapsing time – on account of the fact that filled space, i.e., “the pure image of all ma gnitudes (quantorum) for outer sense” (B182) cannot be separated from elapsing time, i.e., the pure image of all magnitudes (quantorum) “for all objects of the senses in general” (B182), 2) concurrently the “pure schema of magnitude (quantitatis)” – number – is to be commensurate with “a manifold in itself” (A99) – nullity in space -time – on account of the fact that space itself, i.e., the “pure image of all magnitudes (quantorum) for outer sense” cannot be separated from time itself, i.e., the pure image o f all magnitudes ( quantorum) “for all objects of the senses in general.” Why is “the manifold for an empirical intuition” or “a manifold in itself” supposed to be commensurate with the “pure schema of magnitude” – “the pure image of all magnitudes”? Here, “the representation of this necessary synthetic unity” (A79) is commensurate with “i2 = -1.” In regard to the issue of “numerical difference of the object (of the senses) itself” (B319), we have already said, “Instead of Kant, we have to say, „a number – quantum continuum – is homogeneous with the appearance itself, and appears to be homogeneous with the multiplicity, insofar as thing in itself – space-time itself – appears as quantum discretum .‟ We comprehend, through empirical intuition and synthesis – „the apprehension of the intuition‟

The metaphysical exploration – an attempt to rectify the foundation of Kant‟s “transcendental philosophy” (B29 1 ) – led us to the findings that while “appearances in general are nothing outside our representations” (A507), appearances themselves are things that exist outside our representations (YAMAMOTO 2018: 20-45). So far, we have already clarified that “appearances themselves (e.g., humans) must be subsumed under the category, but only under the schemata of disappearance of „the things themselves, which appear‟ (B324). Since the objects to which these principles are to be related are things in themselves, it is possible to cognize anything about them synthetically a priori. Now, it is nothing but appearances themselves whose complete cognition, to which in the end all a priori principles must come down, is the „possibility of experience‟ (A156) or „possible experience‟ (A489/B517). Consequently these principles can have as their goal the conditions of the unity of empirical cognition in the synthesis of the appearances. However, since these conditions of the unity are to be thought only in the schema of nullity in space-time, the category contains the function, unrestricted by any sensible condition, of their unity, as of a synthesis in general. We think that „the function, unrestricted by any sensible condition, of their unity, as of a synthesis in general‟ (B224) pertains to space-time itself” (YAMAMOTO 2018: 20-45). Therefore, we have said that “1) the schema of nullity in space-time – „the objects of nature itself‟ (A114) – is equivalent to „the original causes of things‟ (A318), i.e., space-time itself, 2) the categories – the „object of all possible experience‟ (A114) or the conditions of the unity, which are „thought only in the schema of the pure concept of the understanding‟ (B224) – are the causality, 3) space-time itself – the category – and filled space-elapsing time – the categories – signify „principles‟ – the cause and the causality” (YAMAMOTO 20 Kant expl ains it, saying, “You must therefore give your object a priori in intuition, and ground your synthetic proposition on this” (A48). What does to “give your object a priori in intuition” mean? It means that “the rule of its synthesis at the same time yields this intuition a priori in every empirical example” (B221), which is tantamount to saying that “rules of a mathematical synthesis” (B221) and “numerical magnitudes” (B221) should pertain to “ realitas noumenon” (B320) – “a priori intuition” (B40) or nullity in space -time. When Kant makes a discourse in regard to “empirical intuition,” saying, “there is nothing to be encountered in it that pertains to anything in itself, then our transcendental distinction is lost, and we believe ourselves to cognize things in themselves” (A45), we agree with him in the belief that “a thing in itself which one thought through pure concepts of the understanding” (A525/B553), namely through “decomposition to infinity” and “the infinite divisibility ,” is homogeneous with “the a priori concepts of space and time” (B57), which signify “realitas noumenon,” e.g., “a priori intuition” (B40) – the offshoot of “a faculty of synthesis a priori” (A123) – “the origin of which must really be sought in experienc e, out of whose abstracted relations imagination has made something that, to be sure, contains what is general in them” (B57). In view of the fact that “synthetic cognitions” do not correspond to “synthetic a priori cognitions,” Kant‟s “cognition itself a priori in intuition” seems to belong among mere “synthetic cognitions” such as cognizing the triangle in itself – “all geometrical cognition” (B120) – which he calls “principles absolutely” (B358). If “the understanding cannot yield synthetic cognitions from concepts at all” (A301 -B358), “reason” must yield them through “self-cognition” (B294). This means that we have found through “possibility itself” of “possible experience” – through “ a priori principles of the possibility of experience” – that, “with regard to the pure intuitions as well as the pure concepts of the understanding, there are elements of cognition that are to be encountered in us a priori” (B166). The “elements of cognition that are to be encountered in us a priori” correspond to the pure intuitions ( a priori categories), i.e., “objects in themselves in which the absolutely unconditioned might possibly occur” (A508/B536), which manifest in the moment of gravity as “number.” 4. It is “empirical intuition” who se object is a priori intuitions – a pure category – which are to be commensurate with “objects of possible experience,” namely “the field of possible experience.” Therefore, “the conditions of the unity of empirical cognition in the synthesis of the appearances” (A181-B224) – the conditions of the moment of gravity – stand under “the field of possible experience,” or “the field of possible empirical cognition” (A644/B672) – “the field of decomposition to infinity.” We dare to say that 1) the “empirical cognition in the synthesis of the appearances” – the moment of gravity (thereby the infinite divisibility) – is possible through “ a priori cognition in regard to decomposition to infinity,” 2) the moment of gravity (thereby the infinite divisibility) – “every empirical representation of the manifold” (A139) – is to be commensurate with a manifold of sensibility, 3) a priori cognition in regard to the death itself is possible through a priori cognition in regard to the disappearance of “the things themselves, which appear.” Since a priori cognition in regard to the death itself is commensurate with the synthetic a priori judgments in regard to “one thing (numerica identitas)” – the moment of gravity or the light itself – it signifies “one experience” (A108), or “one concept” (A142) or “one cognition” (A108) or “one moment” (A99) or “one representation” (A99) or “one subject” (A265), or “one totality” (A155), or “one complete whole” (A676/B704).

... intuition is considered as determined with respect to the log- ical functions of judgment . " In other words , what is acquired are categories as concepts of the unity of synthesis ... empirical objects concepts of number , or of continuous ... Kant claims to have established his table of categories or "pure concepts of the understanding" according to the "guiding thread" provided by logical forms of judgment. By drawing extensively on Kant's logical writings, Béatrice Longuenesse analyzes this controversial claim, and then follows the thread through its continuation in the transcendental deduction of the categories, the transcendental schemata, and the principles of pure understanding. The result is a systematic, persuasive new interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason. Longuenesse shows that although Kant adopts his inventory of the forms of judgment from logic textbooks of his time, he is nevertheless original in selecting just those forms he holds to be indispensable to our ability to relate representations to objects. Ka

objective validity of the categories , as a priori concepts , rests on the fact that through them alone is experience ... , since the categories are a priori rules for judging, Kant argues that an exhaustive table of categories ... materially” as “ the sum total of all appearances” and he has argued that the categories are objectively valid ...

truthful assertions about beings through the categories. If the synthesis effected by the categories is … modes of intuition that perceive the phenomenon and the thing in itself (finite intuition and infinite … is involved in the act of intuition. Beings are encountered by us through the senses. In experiencing

type: intuitions that require the presence of their object. Kant also distinguished between a priori (pure) and a posteriori (empirical) concepts. Kant borrowed Critique of Pure Reason (German: Kritik der reinen Vernunft; 1781; second edition 1787) is a book by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, in which the author seeks to determine the limits and scope of metaphysics. Also referred to as Kant's "First Critique", it was followed by his Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and Critique of Judgment (1790). In the preface to the first edition, Kant explai In the Transcendental Logic, there is a section (titled The Refutation of Idealism) that is intended to free Kant's doctrine from any vestiges of subjective idealism, which would either doubt or deny the existence of external objects (B274-79). Kant's distinction between the appearance and the thing-in-itself is not intended to imply that nothing knowable exists apart from consciousness, as with subjective idealism. Rather, it declares that knowledge is limited to phenomena as objects of a sensible intuition. In the Fourth Paralogism ("... A Paralogism is a logical fallacy"), Kant further certifies his philosophy as separate from that of subjective idealism by defining his position as a transcendental idealism in accord with empirical realism (A366–80), a form of direct realism. "The Paralogisms of Pure Reason" is the only chapter of the Dialectic that Kant rewrote for the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. In the first edition, the Fourth Paralogism offers a defence of transcendental idealism, which Kant reconsidered and relocated in the second edition. Whereas the Transcendental Aesthetic was concerned with the role of the sensibility, the Transcendental Logic is concerned with the role of the understanding, which Kant defines as the faculty of the mind that deals with concepts. Knowledge, Kant argued, contains two components: intuitions, through which an object is given to us in sensibility, and co Thus, since this information cannot be obtained from analytic reasoning, it must be obtained through synthetic reasoning, i.e., a synthesis of concepts (in this case two and straightness) with the pure (a priori) intuition of space. In this case, however, it was not experience that furnished the third term; otherwise, the necessary and universal character of geometry would be lost. Only space, which is a pure a priori form of intuition, can make this synthetic judgment, thus it must then be a priori. If geometry does not serve this pure a priori intuition, it is empirical, and would be an experimental science, but geometry does not proceed by measurements—it proceeds by demonstrations. Whereas the Transcendental Aesthetic was concerned with the role of the sensibility, the Transcendental Logic is concerned with the role of the understanding, which Kant defines as the faculty of the mind that deals with concepts. Knowledge, Kant argued, contains two components: intuitions, through which an object is given to us in sensibility, and concepts, through which an object is thought in understanding. In the Transcendental Aesthetic, he attempted to show that the a priori forms of intuition were space and time, and that these forms were the conditions of all possible intuition. According to Helge Svare, "It is important to keep in mind what Kant says here about logic in general, and transcendental logic in particular, being the product of abstraction, so that we are not misled when a few pages later he emphasizes the pure, non-empirical character of the transcendental concepts or the categories." Kant's investigations in the Transcendental Logic lead him to conclude that understanding and reason can only legitimately be applied to things as they appear phenomenally to us in experience. What things are in themselves as being noumenal, independent of our cognition, remains limited by what is known through phenomenal experience. The main sections of the Analytic of Concepts are The Metaphysical Deduction and The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. The main sections of the Analytic of Principles are the Schematism, Axioms of Intuition, Anticipations of Perception, Analogies of Experience, Postulates and follow the same recurring tabular form: In the 2nd edition, these sections are followed by a section titled the Refutation of Idealism. ===== The metaphysical deduction ===== In the Metaphysical Deduction, Kant aims to derive twelve pure concepts of the understanding (which he calls "categories") from the logical forms of judgment. In the following section, he will go on to argue that these categories are conditions of all thought in general. Kant arranges the forms of judgment in a table of judgments, which he uses to guide the derivation of the table of categories. The role of the understanding is to make judgments. In judgment, the understanding employs concepts which apply to the intuitions given to us in sensibility. Judgments can take different logical forms, with each form combining concepts in different ways. These schemata are needed to link the pure category to sensed phenomenal appearances because the categories are, as Kant says, heterogeneous with sense intuition. Categories and sensed phenomena, however, do share one characteristic: time. Succession is the form of sense impressions and also of the Category of causality. Therefore, time can be said to be the schema of Categories or pure concepts of the understanding. Throughout the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant seems to restrict his discussion to intuitions of the former type: intuitions that require the presence of their object. Kant also distinguished between a priori (pure) and a posteriori (empirical) concepts. == Tables of principles and categories of understanding in the critique == Kant borrowed the term categories from Aristotle, but with the concession that Aristotle's own categorizations were faulty.

This article proposes an empirical approach to understanding the life of an organism that overcomes reductionist and dualist conceptions. The approach is based on Immanuel Kant's analysis of the cognitive conditions required for the recognition of an organism: the concept of teleology and the assumption of a formative power of self-generation. It is analyzed how these two criteria are applied in the cognition of a developing organism. Using the example of a developmental series of a plant leaf, an active and relational process between observer and developing organism is shown, within which the teleology and self-generating power of the organism can be empirically observed through the mental faculties of understanding and will. Furthermore, it is emphasized that, according to Kant, even physical objects are not readily given, but are actively constituted through the unification of sense perceptions with concepts. This Kantian mode of objectification facilitates cognition of the physical properties of an organism. It can be supplemented with a participatory and co-constitutive mode of realization, in which the teleologically organizing and self-generating power of the organism can become an object of empirical research. It is argued that the participatory mode also facilitates an expanded conception of nature that allows for the existence of living beings within it. Finally, an analogy to Goethe's approach to the living organism is highlighted. In summary, it is stated that it is possible to understand life by consciously participating in it.