Japan's MITI operated through administrative guidance and industrial targeting during the 1950s and 60s
the verdict
SUPPORTED
the evidence backs this
refutedsupported
the weight of evidence
2 sources for · 0 against
Historical scholarship and reference sources indicate that Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was centrally involved in directing Japanese industrial policy, funding research, and directing investment during the post-war decades.
If the industrial policy of Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) gained acclaim for having created an “economic miracle” in the 1950s and 1960s, a spirited counterattack arose in the 1980s, and by time of the bursting of the financial bubble in the 1990s, industrial policy increasingly looked like an outmoded and discredited relic. Events then took an unexpected turn: MITI (since 2001 called the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, or METI) managed to turn a series of bureaucratic and political reforms and upheavals into opportunities for institutional rebirth, while once-proud Japanese companies struggled. Yet in Japan’s aging, slow-growth economy, reigniting dynamism has proved difficult. Efforts to enhance economy-wide productivity have made some progress, but have yet to overcome the obstacles to growth. METI’s expanded jurisdiction and reinforced political support have been matched by demands to enhance the viability of Japanese firms to meet the new competitive pressures and security threats from China and Korea, and even the United States. In some cases, notably the electronics industry, industrial policy has ended up bailing out failing firms. In the crucial automobile industry, in contrast, industrial policy has made significant contributions even as the leading firms have gone global, but METI has received little credit. Continued political support is not guaranteed. Outside Japan, the international financial crisis of 2008–2009, the failure of many developing countries to surmount an apparent middle-income trap, and the rise of China have converged to spark renewed interest in industrial policy and the experience of Japan.
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (通商産業省, Tsūshō-sangyō-shō; MITI) was a ministry of the Government of Japan from 1949 to 2001. The MITI was one of the most powerful government agencies in Japan and, at the height of its influence, effectively ran much of Japanese industrial policy, funding research and directing investment. In 2001, MITI was merged with other agencies during the Ce
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (通商産業省, Tsūshō-sangyō-shō; MITI) was a ministry of the Government of Japan from 1949 to 2001. The MITI was one of the most powerful government agencies in Japan and, at the height of its influence, effectively ran much of Japanese industrial policy, funding research and directing investment. In 2001, MITI was merged with other agencies during the Central Government Reform to form the newly created Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).
Dupont, for example, which had a strict policy of transferring process technologies only to firms in which it had more than 50% equity, and thus managerial control, was forced to break this policy in the case of Japan.
MITI also exerted influence over regulating the Japanese technological industry. Under its management, MITI has reduced unnecessary firm-wide competition that may overinflate the price of a technology, as well as blocking the possibility of any individual Japanese firm creating a monopoly on their specific agreement. MITI does this by forcing Japanese firms that are dependent on their grants to enter different licensing agreement to, after the agreement has been signed, further license it to any other Japanese firms that are interested in developing that product.
However, Lynn also analyzes and notes instances and cases where MITI's technology import policies have failed in the 1950s-60s. MITI's practice of targeting key industries that its members believe will advance Japan's economy leads them, in many cases, delay applications for partnership grants of specific technologies that they do not believe are a priority, and individual Japanese firms that they do not believe have the experience and the capacity to successfully import those technologies. Lynn brings up cases where MITI has stalled and enforced outrageous terms in different situations, relating to agreements for the importation of Texas Instruments (TI) and polypropylene. MITI has also been accused of favoring bigger firms and discriminating against small firms such as in the case of a licensing agreement between Sony and Western Electric (WE). While acknowledging that MITI's delay has cost…
Everything we examined (2)
This check searched the claim as stated. It did not run a separate search for evidence against it.