Research has highlighted a puzzling discrepancy in our selective attention performance: whereas in some circumstances we are able to be highly selective, at other times we can exhibit high levels of distraction. The load theory of attention and cognitive control provides an explanation for these contrasting observations, proposing that the extent to which people can focus their attention in the face of irrelevant distractions depends on the level and type of information load involved in their current task. According to the theory, the extent to which unattended visual information is perceived depends on the perceptual load of the attended task, such that increasing the level of perceptual load in the task decreases processing of task-irrelevant stimuli. Effective prioritization of task-relevant stimuli in the face of competition from irrelevant distractors is proposed to depend on the availability of executive control functions. Thus, loading executive control results in increased processing of irrelevant stimuli. This chapter presents converging research from a wide range of approaches in support of these proposals, as well as highlighting some of load theory’s wider influences in areas as diverse as emotion processing, developmental psychology, and the understanding of psychological disorders.

Observers must select goal‐directed stimuli in lieu of distractors in the environment for preferential information processing. This selection, according to the load theory of attention, is modulated by cognitive load, involving the frontal cortices, with more significant distractor interference under high cognitive load, with strained executive control resources. Evidence in support of this theory exists; however, working memory tasks were predominately used in these investigations. The influence of other types of cognitive load on distractor processing is largely unknown. An interleaved pro‐ and anti‐saccade task has often been used to investigate executive control in which subjects are instructed in advance to either automatically look at the peripheral stimulus (pro‐saccade), or to suppress the automatic response and voluntarily look in the direction opposite of the stimulus (anti‐saccade). Distinct frontal preparatory activity has been clearly characterized during preparation for pro‐ and anti‐saccades, with higher inhibition‐related activity in preparation for anti‐saccades than pro‐saccades. Here, we used an interleaved pro‐ and anti‐saccade paradigm to investigate the modulation of distractor interference by cognitive load in a group of 24 healthy young adults. Luminant distractors were used to evoke automatic pupillary responses to evaluate distractor processing. Greater pupillary dilation following dark distractor presentation was observed in the anti‐saccade than the pro‐saccade preparation. These effects, however, were absent in pupillary constriction following bright distractors. Together, our results support the load theory of attention, importantly highlighting the potential of using involuntary changes in pupil size to objectively investigate attentional selection under load.

Humans copy other people without their conscious awareness, a behaviour known as automatic imitation. Although automatic imitation forms a key part of daily social interactions, we do not copy other people indiscriminately. Instead, we control imitative tendencies by prioritising some actions and inhibiting others. To date, neuroimaging studies investigating the control of automatic imitation have produced inconsistent findings. Some studies suggest that imitation control relies on a domain-specific neural circuit related to social cognition (the theory-of-mind network). In contrast, other studies show engagement of a domain-general neural circuit that is engaged during a diverse range of cognitive control tasks (the multiple demand network). Given the inconsistency of prior findings, in the current paper we avoided problems associated with interpreting individual studies by performing a meta-analysis. To do so, we used a multi-level kernel density analysis to quantitatively identify consistent patterns of activation across functional magnetic resonance imaging studies investigating the control of imitation. Our results show clear and consistent evidence across studies that the control of automatic imitation is guided by brain regions in the multiple demand network including dorsolateral frontoparietal cortex. In contrast, there was only limited evidence that regions in the theory of mind network were engaged. Indeed, medial prefrontal cortex showed no consistent engagement and right temporoparietal junction engagement may reflect spatial rather than imitative control. As such, the current meta-analysis reinforces the role of domain-general control mechanisms and provides limited evidence in support of the role of domain-specific processes in regulating imitative tendencies. Consequently, neurocognitive models of imitation need updating to place more emphasis on domain-general control mechanisms, as well as to consider more complex organisational structures of control, which may involve contributions from multiple cognitive systems.

Mindfulness practice is often described as yielding a “quieter mind,” yet the specific cognitive mechanisms underlying this experience remain understudied. This research investigates how focused attention (FA) meditation influences automatic semantic processing through a series of conflict-based tasks (e.g., Stroop). In a between-groups design, participants were randomly assigned to either brief FA meditation or mind-wandering control conditions. Results demonstrated that, compared to the control group, FA meditation significantly reduced the Stroop congruency facilitation effect in the classic color-word task. Crucially, this reduction in facilitation was not observed in two additional non-semantic control tasks (administered solely to FA participants). This selective pattern suggests that FA meditation temporarily inhibits automatic semantic processing rather than enhancing reactive control or general selective attention. Notably, these effects emerged in meditation novices following a brief (10-minute) guided FA session, indicating that even short-term meditation can modulate automatic cognitive processes. These findings provide empirical support for the role of mindfulness in reducing automatic thought processes and contribute to our understanding of its underlying cognitive mechanisms, offering insights into how brief meditation interventions might help individuals better manage intrusive thoughts and automatic cognitive processes in daily life.

Mechanisms of attention: a developmental study. A model of selective attention is proposed which contains a number of properties. First, stimuli which are irrelevant to the subjects' task can be analyzed to semantic levels automatically, and such stimuli can produce intrusion/interference effects. Second, two mechanisms by which selection is achieved are habituation to, and inhibition of, these irrelevant stimuli. A series of studies demonstrates that both the ability to process automatically irrelevant stimuli and the habituation mechanisms of attention are observable by Grade 2, whereas the inhibitory mechanism is not always evident at this stage. It is suggested that the greater distractability of children in certain situations may be due in part to the underutilization of this inhibitory mechanism. We further propose that children may be able to employ inhibitory mechanisms in more familiar perceptual-motor tasks. Published in Journal of experimental child psychology (1989)

Attentional shift (or shift of attention) occurs when directing attention to a point increases the efficiency of processing of that point and includes Attentional shift (or shift of attention) occurs when directing attention to a point increases the efficiency of processing of that point and includes inhibition to decrease attentional resources to unwanted or irrelevant inputs. Shifting of attention is needed to allocate attentional resources to more efficiently process information from a stimulus. Research has shown that when an object or area In attention research, one prominent theory attempting to explain how visual attention is shifted is the moving-spotlight theory. The primary idea being that attention is like a movable spotlight that is directed towards intended targets, focusing on each target…

It is often assumed that word reading proceeds automatically. Here, we tested this assumption by recording event-related potentials during a psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm, requiring lexical decisions about written words. Specifically, we selected words differing in their orthographic neighborhood size–the number of words that can be obtained from a target by exchanging a single letter–and investigated how influences of this variable depend on the availability of central attention. As expected, when attentional resources for lexical decisions were unconstrained, words with many