Infinitely repeated games accurately model real-world economic interactions
While traditional laboratory experiments show that infinitely repeated games can successfully predict cooperative behaviors under certain controlled conditions, modern economic and game-theoretic research demonstrates that real-world interactions are frequently complicated by partner choices, institutional frameworks, and concurrent games, making standard infinitely repeated game models incomplete.
The claim posits that infinitely repeated games accurately model real-world economic interactions. While foundational experimental literature (such as papers [0] and [2]) supports the idea that human behavior in the lab aligns with theoretical models of infinitely repeated games, newer literature highlights significant limitations. Real-world interactions involve institutional frameworks [1], partner switching dynamics [4], concurrent cross-game spillovers [5], and market anomalies where standard frequency models fail [11]. Thus, the claim is heavily contested and nuanced rather than universally supported.
The evidence we hold leans evenly split
How this was weighed
official record 3x · fact-check 2x · hedged 1x · crowd & reference 1x
- Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evi · peer-reviewed · supports · weight 2 · 2005
- Cooperation Under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evi · peer-reviewed · supports · weight 1.05 · 2002
- Optimization Incentives and Cooperation in Infinitely Repeat · peer-reviewed · supports · weight 1 · 2026
- The social leverage effect: Institutions transform weak repu · peer-reviewed · refutes · weight 1.05 · 2024
- Repeated games with partner choice. · peer-reviewed · refutes · weight 1.05 · 2025
- Dynamics of cooperation in concurrent games. · peer-reviewed · refutes · weight 1.05 · 2025
- Interaction Frequency and Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated · peer-reviewed · refutes · weight 1 · 2026
Pedro Dal Bó. Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games. 2005. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282805775014434
Paper [0] provides experimental evidence that the shadow of the future in infinitely repeated games successfully reduces opportunistic behavior in line with theoretical predictions.
Lie-Panis J, Fitouchi L, Baumard N, André JB. The social leverage effect: Institutions transform weak reputation effects into strong incentives for cooperation.. 2024. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2408802121
Paper [1] demonstrates that real-world economic cooperation often requires institutional structures rather than mere reputation effects modeled in basic repeated games.
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Pedro Dal Bo. Cooperation Under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games. 2002. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.332580
Paper [2] finds strong empirical support that continuation probabilities in infinitely repeated games lead to cooperation levels that match theoretical equilibrium outcomes.
Maximilian Andres, Juri Nithammer. Optimization Incentives and Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games. 2026. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6313098
Paper [10] uses laboratory data to show that optimization incentives in infinitely repeated games accurately capture behavioral cooperation under certain dilemma severities.
Graser C, Fujiwara-Greve T, García J, van Veelen M. Repeated games with partner choice.. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1012810
Paper [4] shows that standard repeated game models fail to capture human interaction because allowing partner choice alters cooperation dynamics significantly.
Rossetti CSL, Hauser OP, Hilbe C. Dynamics of cooperation in concurrent games.. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-025-56083-7
Paper [5] finds that concurrent multi-game interactions create spillover effects that complicate simple repeated game assumptions.
Mia Tam, Ralph-Christopher Bayer. Interaction Frequency and Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games. 2026. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6597967
Paper [11] presents experimental findings where higher interaction frequency in repeated market settings fails to increase collusion as standard infinitely repeated game models predict.
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