In Western democracies it is held that parties and their positions affect how politicians choose to make public expenditure and investment. This article examines the public policy choices of politicians in India, a large well-established democracy with remarkable subnational variation. Public expenditure, from education and health to agriculture and irrigation, is analysed. Counterintuitive findings – that election timing and political factors play a strong role in the subnational states, and that party competition increases investment in education – are explained by highlighting the role economic and political uncertainty plays in politicians’ choices. Building a ‘Polanyi’ argument enhanced by a supply-side mechanism highlights the importance of compensation and insurance and the imperatives of political stability for subnational politicians, who attempt to maximize re-election chances in an uncertain environment. Political Cycles, Political Institutions and Public Expenditure in India, 1980–2000 | British Journal of Political Science | Cambridge Core Search Institution Login Search Hostname: page-component-66d9dcfd78-8c77b Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-08-09T00:23:09.910Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false Home > Journals > British Journal of Political Science > Volume 40 Issue 1 > Political Cycles, Political Institutions and Public... 7 7 Chhibber , Pradeep , Shastri , Sandeep and Sisson , Richard , ‘Federal Arrangements and the Provision of Public Goods in India’ , Asian Survey , 44 ( 2004 ), 339 – 352 , find that citizens hold the relevant state governments responsible for the provision of local public goods in India. CrossRef Google Scholar 8 8 India has twenty-eight subnational states and, since her independence in 1947, held fourteen regular national elections in sixty years with one brief authoritarian interlude (1975–77), which illustrates India’s extensive experience with democratic institutions and elections. Some studies of decision-making on expenditure mostly focus on the national level (see, e.g., Basu , Anuradha , Public Expenditure Decision-Making: The Indian Experience ( New Delhi : Sage , 1995 Google Scholar )). 11 11 Many of India’s states are ruled by ideologically driven parties, such as the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M), Telugu Desam Party (TDP), Dravida Munnettra Kazhagam (DMK), and the All India Dravida Munnettra Kazhagam (AIDMK). Google Scholar 16 16 See Sinha , Aseema , ‘The Changing Political Economy of India: A Historical Institutionalist Approach’ , India Review , 3 ( 2004 ), 25 – 63 CrossRef Google Scholar . 17 17 See, e.g., Saez , Lawrence , Federalism Without a Centre: The Impact of Political and Economic Reform on India’s Federal System ( New Delhi : Sage Publications , 2002 ) Google Scholar . Also, see Jenkins , Rob , Democratic Politics and Economic Reforms in India ( Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1999 ) Google Scholar ; Rudolph , Lloyd and Hoeber Rudolph , Susanne , ‘The Iconization of Chandrababu: Sharing Sovereignty in India’s Federal Market Economy’ , Economic and Political Weekly , 36 ( 2001 ), 1541 – 1552 Google Scholar . The Preference for Non Incumbents in Indian National Elections’ (unpublished manuscript, Columbia University, 2004 ) Google Scholar ; Kumar , Jayesh , ‘Parliamentary Elections and National Politics’ , Journal of Indian School of Political Economy , 15 ( 2003 ), 633 – 646 Google Scholar . 19 19 India has experienced strong anti-incumbency advantage with regular alternation of power in the last fifteen years or so. 20 20 Bergstrom , Theodore and Goodman , Robert , ‘Private Demands for Public Goods’ , American Economic Review , 63 ( 1973 ), 280 – 296 , pioneered the empirical application of the median voter model to explain the supply of public goods Google Scholar . 28 28 Jaffrelot , Christophe , The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India ( New York : Columbia University Press , 1996 ) Google Scholar ; Blom Hansen , Thomas and Jaffrelot , Christophe , eds, The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India ( New York : Oxford University Press , 2001 ) Google Scholar ; Overstreet , Gene and Windmiller , Marshall , Communism in India ( Berkeley : University of California Press , 1959 ) Google Scholar ; Nossiter , T. J. , Marxist State Governments in India: Politics, Economics, and Society ( London : Pinter Publishers , 1988 ) Google Scholar ; Mallick , Ross , Development Policy of a Communist Government: West Bengal Since 1977 ( Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1993 ) CrossRef Google Scholar ; Mallick , Ross , Indian Communism: Opposition, Collaboration, and Institutionalization ( Delhi : Oxford University Press , 1994 ) Google Scholar . 29 29 See, e.g., Hibbs , , ‘Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy’ Google Scholar . We request that scholars who make use of the POLEX-India dataset, version 2008.1, use the following citation: Lawrence Saez (2008) ‘Political cycles, political institutions, and public service expenditure in India (POLEX-India) data set, version 2008.1’. 46 46 Besley , Tim and Burgesss , Robin , ‘The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India’ , Quarterly Journal of Economics , 117 ( 2002 ), 1415 – 1451 CrossRef Google Scholar . Political Cycles, Political Institutions and Public Expenditure in India, 1980–2000 Volume 40, Issue 1 Lawrence Sáez and Aseema Sinha Political Cycles, Political Institutions and Public Expenditure in India, 1980–2000 Volume 40, Issue 1 Lawrence Sáez and Aseema Sinha DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123409990226 Available formats PDF Please select a format to save. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep content for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Save × × Reply to: Submit a response Title * Please enter a title for your response.