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the claim
Idealism and physicalism make distinct ontological claims about the fundamental substance of reality
the verdict
SUPPORTED
the evidence backs this
refutedsupported
the weight of evidence
5 sources for · 0 against
AS REPORTEDno primary record reached; this is what the reporting says

Idealism and physicalism make opposing ontological claims regarding whether reality is fundamentally mental or physical.

Evidence for · 5
Wikipedia: Idealism
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Reference article covering this claim directly
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Judged against reference works: claims of this kind are settled by reference works, not journal abstracts.

More for · 4
Wikipedia: Physicalism
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Reference article covering this claim directly
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Substance
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It discusses substance as fundamental entities in metaphysics.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Physicalism
cited by 0
It addresses physicalism's claims regarding fundamental physical features.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Idealism
cited by 0
It highlights idealism's ontological point about reality.
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first checked04 Aug 2026
judged → SUPPORTED · 7504 Aug 2026
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