Purpose Phenomenology is widely recognised for its power to generate nuanced understanding of lived experience and human existence. However, phenomenology is often made inaccessible to prospective researchers due to its specialised nomenclature and dense philosophical underpinnings. This paper explores the value of the researcher’s lived experience as a pathway into phenomenological inquiry. The purpose of this paper is to improve the accessibility of phenomenology as a method for qualitative analysis. It achieves this by aligning Husserl’s concept of phenomenological epoche, or bracketing of preconceptions, and the author’s lived experience as a practitioner of kendo, or Japanese fencing. Design/methodology/approach The paper employs the narrative vignette as a means of illuminating the intersections between kendo practice and the application of phenomenological epoche as it applies to the understanding of embodied sensemaking. Reflections on the narrative vignette identified a suite of techniques from kendo practice that were applied to a phenomenological approach for critical incident interviews. These techniques were then applied to 30 critical incident, semi-structured interviews as part of a PhD research project into embodied sensemaking. Findings The results from these interviews suggest that the kendo-derived techniques were effective in generating thick narratives from participants during semi-structured interviews. Examination of the results provided insights into the linkage between phenomenology as a continental philosophy and eastern perspectives such as those found within the Zen traditions and other aesthetic practices. Originality/value This research suggests that lived experience such as kendo practice can provide a ready-to-hand pathway to phenomenological inquiry.

This paper is on Husserl’s phenomenological method; it is an attempt to show how Husserl in pursuit for a philosophy without presuppositions, established phenomenology to serve as a rigorous science of the world.  Husserl in developing phenomenology insists that its procedure has to deal only with description of its objects rather than explanations.  Phenomenology only begins after the phenomenologist has carried out transcendental phenomenological reductions, starting first with eidetic reduction through which all existential and natural attitudes are brack-eted and put out of action to yield only essences before consciousness.  This is followed by phen- omenological reduction proper, which involves a complex of reductive phases Husserl, refers to as ‘epoche’ – which involves bracketing of all historical and existential judgments regarding what is ‘given’ and even the experiencer himself. What is left after the reduction is the transcendental ego with its transcendental life. It is then possible for consciousness to begin an entirely new task of interpreting the world at this level, as a coherent system constituted by itself alone. Husserl’s Phenomenological method is contrasted with Heidegger’s phenomenological method. Heidegger strongly rejected Husserl’s bracketing of the actual world and his transcendental ego. HUSSERL, HEIDEGGER AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD | EPH-International Journal of Humanities and Social Science HUSSERL, HEIDEGGER AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD Authors Martin Okwu Onwuegbusi Ph.D Dept. of Philosophy Olabisi Onabanjo University Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria. DOI: https://doi.org/10.53555/eijhss.v5i3.94 Abstract This paper is on Husserl’s phenomenological method; it is an attempt to show how Husserl in pursuit for a philosophy without presuppositions, established phenomenology to serve as a rigorous science of the world. Husserl in developing phenomenology insists that its procedure has to deal only with description of its objects rather than explanations. Phenomenology only begins after the phenomenologist has carried out transcendental phenomenological reductions, starting first with eidetic reduction through which all existential and natural attitudes are brack-eted and put out of action to yield only essences before consciousness. This is followed by phen- omenological reduction proper, which involves a complex of reductive phases Husserl, refers to as ‘epoche’ – which involves bracketing of all historical and existential judgments regarding what is ‘given’ and even the experiencer himself. What is left after the reduction is the transcendental ego with its transcendental life. It is then possible for consciousness to begin an entirely new task of interpreting the world at this level, as a coherent system constituted by itself alone. Husserl’s Phenomenological method is contrasted with Heidegger’s phenomenological method. Heidegger strongly rejected Husserl’s bracketing of the actual world and his transcendental ego . Downloads Download data is not yet available. References . Kockelmans, J. (1967), Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy in the light of Contemporary Criticism, taken from: Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation, [Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company, INC; Garden City, New York], 221. Cited hereafter as Kockelmans, J. (1967). . Ibid. 226. . Ibid. 223. By ‘all-encompassing rational knowledge of all that is’, Husserl understands a kind of philosophy that has the same aspirations and 34The term ‘radical’ here is one of the popular terms in Phenomenology; negatively it means freedom from any assumptions or beliefs of any kind; but positively it means the insightful establishment of all elements of knowledge. (Cf. Marvin Farber, in Kockelmans (1967), 49. 35Kockelmans, (1967), ed., 30. . Marvin, Farber (1940), “The Ideal of Presuppositionless Philosophy”, in Marvin Farber, ed., Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl [Cambridge]; Reprinted with permission in J.J. Kockelmans, (1967), ed., 50. . Kockelmans, (1967), ed., 30-31. . Husserl, Ideen, 72 (Gibson, 113) quoted in “The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl” written by Oskar Becker, and published in The Phenomenology of Husserl, Selected Critical Readings, edited by R.O. Elveton, (1970) 63. . Husserl often in connection with transcendental phenomenological reduction uses the term ‘epoche’; at first this may sound like a ‘reduction’, but he made a distinction between the two terms: the change of attitude, i.e. the suspension of all natural attitude towards the objects of experience is called epoche, this is a precondition for reducing the natural world to a world of phenomena. Transcendental phenomenological reduction, however, encompasses both the epoche and the reduction in a narrower sense. [Cf., Kockelmans, (1967), 61]. . Cf. Kockelmans, (1967), ed., 222. . Ibid, 223. . Ibid, 223. . Husserl, Ideen I, 135; as quoted in Kockelmans (1967) ed., 223. . Gaston Berger, (1941), Le Cogito Dans la Philosophie de Husserl (Paris: Aubier) 94-95; as quoted in Kockelmans (1967), edited, 223. . Cf. Kockelmans, (1967), 224. . Ibid, 224. . Husserl, Ideas, 241 . Husserl, Ideas, 346. . Cooper, D. (1990), 45. . Husserl, Ideas, 345. . Cooper, D. (1990), 45. . Ibid, 46. . Ibid, 46. . Cf. also: Schrag, O. Calvin, in Kockelmans (1967) ed., 280. . Ibid, 281. . Heidegger, M. (1983), the Basic Problems of Phenomenology, [Indiana University Press], 64. . Ontology” is the study of existence; it is the most general branch of metaphysics concerned with the nature of being; or a particular theory of being. While “ontic” pertains to things of real existence. . Cf. Kockelmans, (1967), ed., 226. . Landgrebe, Luwig (1952), Philosophie der Gegenwart, [Bonn]; Athenaum Verlag; 87-94, as quoted in Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy in the Light of Contemporary Criticism, by J.J. Kockelmans in (1967) edition; 229. . Ibid, 229. 72Ibid, 229. . Landgrebe, Luwig (1952), 99-100; quoted in J.J.

This study explores the concept of the "horizon" as articulated in Edmund Husserl's phenomenological philosophy and subsequently expanded by Hans-Georg Gadamer. It begins by investigating the etymological and philosophical origins of the term "horizon”, tracing its evolution from classical to contemporary philosophical discourse. This research underscores how Husserl’s notion of horizontal intentionality reconfigures our comprehension of perception and meaning, perceiving the horizon as both a boundary and an expansive realm of possibilities that frames every conscious act. Through the application of phenomenological reduction and the method of bracketing, this paper illustrates that the horizon is not a physical or fixed limit, but a dynamic and subjective structure that varies with one's perspective and awareness. Building upon this foundation, the article critically examines Gadamer’s hermeneutical concept of the "fusion of horizons”, which emphasises achieving mutual understanding by integrating historically and culturally specific viewpoints. This study evaluates this concept within the contexts of cross-cultural dialogue, philosophical interpretation, and the challenges posed by relativism. Drawing on thinkers, such as Derrida, Levinas, and E. D. Hirsch, it provides a detailed analysis of the tensions between universality and difference, particularly questioning whether true fusion can occur without the risk of assimilating or erasing otherness. By integrating insights from phenomenology and hermeneutics, this study highlights the enduring significance of the horizon in understanding consciousness, culture, and interpretation. It argues that the horizon is not merely a metaphysical boundary but a metaphor for the continuous, dialogical process of creating meaning. The horizon’s flexibility and openness render it a crucial concept in fields such as philosophy, cultural studies, and interdisciplinary research. Ultimately, this study affirms the philosophical and practical importance of horizon fusion in fostering deeper intersubjective and intercultural understanding.

Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (Austrian German: [ˈɛdmʊnd ˈhʊsɐl]; 8 April 1859 – 27 April 1938) was an Austrian-German philosopher and mathematician who established the school of phenomenology. In his early work, he elaborated critiques of historicism and of psychologism in logic based on analyses of intentionality. In his mature work, he sought to develop a systematic foundational science based Later, Husserl lectured at Prague in 1935 and Vienna in 1936, which resulted in a very differently styled work that, while innovative, is no less problematic: Die Krisis (Belgrade 1936). Husserl describes here the cultural crisis gripping Europe, then approaches a philosophy of history, discussing Galileo, Descartes, several British philosophers, and Kant. The apolitical Husserl before had specifically avoided such historical discussions, pointedly preferring to go directly to an investigation of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty and others question whether Husserl here does not undercut his own position, in that Husserl had attacked in principle historicism, while specifically designing his phenomenology to be rigorous enough to transcend the limits of history. On the contrary, Husserl may be indicating here that historical traditions are merely features given to the pure ego's intuition, like any other. A longer section follows on the "lifeworld" [Lebenswelt], one not observed by the objective logic of science, but a world seen through subjective experience. Yet a problem arises similar to that dealing with 'history' above, a chicken-and-egg problem. Does the lifeworld contextualize and thus compromise… Husserl's thought is revolutionary in several ways, most notably in the distinction between "natural" and "phenomenological" modes of understanding. In the former, sense-perception in correspondence with the material realm constitutes the known reality, and understanding is premised on the accuracy of the perception and the objective knowability of what is called the "real world". Phenomenological understanding strives to be rigorously "presuppositionless" by means of what Husserl calls "phenomenological reduction". This reduction is not conditioned but rather transcendental: in Husserl's terms, pure consciousness of absolute Being. In Husserl's work, consciousness of any given thing calls for discerning its meaning as an "intentional object". Such an object does not simply strike the senses, to be interpreted or misinterpreted by mental reason; it has already been selected and grasped, grasping being an etymological connotation, of percipere, the root of "perceive".