Human behavior in one-shot perfect information games deviates from game-theoretic rationality
the verdict
SUPPORTED
the evidence backs this
confidence 79/100
Human decision-making in strategic settings regularly diverges from the assumptions of classical game-theoretic rationality, driven by bounded rationality, social norms, and cognitive limitations.
Evidence for · 3
(Un)Bounded Rationality in Decision Making and Game Theory – Back to Square One?
2010 · cited by 3
Paper 1 discusses how bounded rationality challenges standard game-theoretic premises where symmetric rationality is assumed.
See more details
More for · 2
A norm about harvest division is maintained by a desire to follow tradition, not by social policing.
2025 · cited by 1
Paper 6 demonstrates that human behavior in harvest-division games deviates from pure payoff maximization and game-theoretic rationality.
Learning in Interactive Decision-Making: The Interplay Between Cognitive Abilities and the Strategic Environment.
2025 · cited by 0
Paper 10 highlights systematic departures from theoretically optimal behavior in strategic interactive decision-making.