Europe into war, hour by hour, between August 1 and 4, 1914: On August 1, Germany ordered general mobilization; its offensive might have taken a radically The Guns of August (published in the UK as August 1914) is a 1962 book centered on the first month of World War I written by Barbara W. Tuchman. After introductory chapters, Tuchman describes in great detail the opening events of the conflict. The book's focus then becomes a military history of the contestants, chiefly the great powers. The Guns of August provides a narrative of the earliest stage G… On… Britain – The military cooperation with France evolved from informal arrangements to a formal naval agreement and Britain preparing to deploy the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) but these initiatives were supported by a narrow and fragile political will (chapter 4). Russia – Despite internal weaknesses and corruption, Russia's massive army planned an invasion of Eastern Prussia, prompting Germany to prepare reactive strategies to protect this critical territory (chapter 5). "Outbreak" meticulously chronicles the events that led Europe into war, hour by hour, between August 1 and 4, 1914: On August 1, Germany ordered general mobilization; its offensive might have taken a radically different direction if Wilhelm II, on the basis of a misunderstood telegram from London, had managed to convince Moltke to change plans; but Moltke prevailed and Luxembourg was invaded (chapter 6). France declared general mobilization on the same day in response to Germany's ultimatum to Russia while in London Prime Minister H. H. Asquith's divided Cabinet failed to move (chapter 7). On August 2, 1914, Germany presented Belgium with an ultimatum, which King Albert rejected (chapter 8). – and laid out war options that generals could implement depending on circumstances. ==== Ch. 4 – "A Single British Soldier …" ==== Russia's defeat to Japan in 1905 precipitated Germany in probing France in Morocco and Britain in developing military arrangements with France after Campbell-Bannerman authorised Wilson to open informal works with his French counterpart. But this embryonic military cooperation waned after the first Moroccan crisis subsided. 5 – The Russian steamroller ==== Not withstanding its defeats (Crimea in 1856, Manchuria in 1905) and defects, Russia's imposing 6.5 million men army unsettled Germany and reassured France and Britain, its Triple Entente allies. After the defeat to Japan, Grand Duke Nicholas, as chair of the Council of National Defence, initiated military reforms but these were thwarted in 1908 when the conservatives dissolved it. The same year, Sukhomlinov became Minister of War. Corrupt and inefficient, he froze the modernisation of the army and changed Chief of Staff six times by 1914. Still, despite these weaknesses, Russia planned to invade Eastern Prussia with two armies totalling 800,000 men. But Germany was determined to retain this vital territory. Max Hoffmann, anticipating that the Russian army would have to split around the Masurian lakes, considered two reactive tactics: a retreat or a frontal assault on either flank. === Outbreak === Archduke Franz Ferdinand's assassination on June 28, 1914, led Austria to seek Serbia's annexation, with German backing on July 5. Austria's ultimatum on July 23, followed by a declaration of war on July 28 and Belgrade's bombardment on July 29, provoked Russia to mobilize on July 30 to defend Slav interests and its prestige. Germany's ultimatum to Russia on July 31 intensified the crisis. "War pressed against every frontier." ==== Ch. 6 – August 1: Berlin ==== Kaiser Wilhelm decreed general mobilization at 5 PM on August 1, initiating the invasion of Luxembourg at 7 PM. However, an opportunity to change this course and the twentieth century emerged shortly after 5 PM when Foreign Minister Jagow and Chancellor On the military front: On August 3 at 6:30 PM, Ambassador Schoen delivered to Viviani the German declaration of war on France on the ground of organized hostility, alleged French aviators bombarding Nuremberg and flying over neutral Belgium, all of which Viviani categorically denied. On August 4, Germany invaded Belgium at Gemmerich at 8:02 AM after its ultimatum was rejected. Moltke, who had anticipated in 1912 that invading Belgium would trigger Britain’s entry into the war, was not surprised, contrary to the Kaiser and Beltmann-Hollweg, when Grey sent Britain’s ultimatum to Germany and demanded a reply by midnight. Overall, Tuchman argues that while some of the war's major combatants looked forward to a war, specifically Germany and Austria-Hungary, all of them expected it to be a short one, and none of them desired or anticipated a prolonged war. Likewise, she argues that even successes, such as the First Battle of the Marne, a French victory, were to some extent accidental victories that were won despite, and not because of, military leadership or strategy. The role of the public opinion is only fleetingly mentioned, and economic preparation for war, though noted, gets nothing more." === Anti-German bias === For Trumpener, Tuchman's treatment of imperial Germany is "blatantly one-sided." Tuchman, according to Trumpener, transforms "the Germans of 1914 into a nation of barbarians [...] invariably unpleasant, hysterical, or outright brutish [...] The armies, marching like 'predatory ants' across Belgium, soon reveal 'the beast beneath the German skin'. In his diary for Monday, 22 October 1962, he wrote: Washington, in a rather panicky way, have been urging a NATO 'alert' with all that this implies (in our case, a Royal Proclamation and the call up of Reservists). I told him that we do not repeat not agree at this stage. N. [General Norstad] agreed with this and said he thought NATO powers would take the same view. I said that 'mobilization' had sometimes caused war. Here it was absurd since the additional forces made available by 'Alert' had no military significance.