... assertoric force . This may seem an excessively reductive treatment of the connection between truth and assertoric force . But its merits emerge when it is compared ... expressions of serious THREE PUZZLES IN FREGE'S THEORY OF TRUTH 7. Gottlob Frege's à ber Sinn und Bedeutung (`On Sense and Reference'), has come to be seen, in the century since its publication in 1892, as one of the seminal texts of analytic philosophy. It, along with the rest of Frege's writings on logic and mathematics, came to mark out a whole new domain of inquiry. This volume bears witness to the continuing importance and influence of that agenda. It contains original papers written by leading Frege scholars for the conference held in 1992 in Karlovy Vary to celebrate the publication of Frege's essay. The fourteen essays show how the questions Frege discusses in that essay connect intimately with issues much debated in current philosophy of language and philosophy of mind.

... Views Munton ( 2017 ) proposes to ascribe to Frege the belief that reference occurs on a case - by - case basis according to the force with which a sentence is uttered . A sentence refers if uttered with ( real ) assertoric force . It ... This book explores Gottlob Frege’s mature views on truth, as expressed primarily in a late series of essays entitled “Logical Investigations”, and related unpublished works. A common approach in Fregean exegesis is to interpret the claims he makes and then to examine both their independent credibility and their consistency with his broader thought. Although this is part of the book's approach, its main aim is to trace a journey of thought that Frege presents in these works for pedagogical purposes. By doing this, Frege's claims regarding truth are presented within a dialectical context thereby showing that many of the puzzles that surround Frege's claims can be resolved in a coherent and satisfying manner. Frege's Views on Truth is essential reading for all scholars, researchers and advanc

In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein famously criticizes Frege's conception of assertion. "Frege's opinion that every assertion contains an assumption", says Wittgenstein, rests on the possibility of parsing every assertoric sentence into two components: one expressing the assumption that is put forward for assertion, the other expressing that it is asserted. But this possibility does not entail that the "assertion consists of two acts, entertaining and asserting" – any more than the possibility of rendering assertions as pairs of questions and affirmative answers entails that they consist of questions. Frege scholars protest that such criticism is inappropriate, not only because Frege doesn't speak about assumptions, but also – and crucially – because Wittgenstein fails to address the logical nature of assertion as reflected in Frege's use of the judgment stroke. They seem to read Wittgenstein's argument in the light of a remark in the Tractatus saying that the judgment stroke is "logically meaningless" because it simply indicates that the author holds the propositions marked with this sign to be true. In this paper, I argue that Wittgenstein's criticism of Frege is not that the latter's conception of judgment and assertion contains a corrupting psychological element. Rather, the criticism is that for Frege judgment and assertion are composed of two separate acts, i.e. an act of referring to a truth value and an act of determining which of the two it is. Through a detailed examination of the 'black-spot analogy' in the Tractatus, I want to show that Wittgenstein presents a serious objection to Frege's conception of judgment and assertion.