Some contemporary scientists are using comparative neurobiological data to argue that non-mammalian vertebrates have feelings, most notably of pain (e.g., Braithwaite, 2010; Mashour and Alkire, 2012), while Key (2016) uses the same general data to reach the opposite conclusion. In a nutshell, he argues that fish cannot feel pain because fish don’t have a neocortex, which humans need to consciously experience pain. I don’t know how these scientists can look at essentially the same data and reach such disparate conclusions, but I suspect that some of them have strong a priori beliefs and, therefore, view the data through differently tinted spectacles. In any case, I think that both sides have overplayed their hands; the debate cannot be settled yet. Georg F. Striedter gstriedt@uci.edu is Professor in the School of Biological Sciences, University of California, Irvine. Editor-in-Chief of Brain, Behavior, and Evolution, his research is on the evolution of vertebrate brains and behavior, including what makes specific taxonomic groups (e.g., humans, primates, birds) behaviorally and neurobiologically unique, with a special interest in synthesizing experimental data that are already published. http://www.cnlm.uci.edu/fellows/georg-striedter As Key (2016) notes in his review, teleost fish have brains that differ radically from those of mammals, especially in the forebrain. Teleost fish do have homologs of the main telencephalic divisions that all vertebrates share, but teleosts and other non-mammalian vertebrates don’t have the kind of laminated neocortex that mammals possess. Key also claims that humans with extensive damage to the neocortex lack consciousness, including feelings of pain. I am less certain of this claim, in part because the neocortex is such a prominent component of human brains that its destruction is likely to throw most of the remaining central nervous system into paralytic disarray (see Merker, 2007, for additional criticisms of the “consciousness is in the neocortex” argument and Langsjo et al., 2012, for some relevant data). However, for the purposes of argument, I am willing to grant that humans with total neocortical lesions tend not to feel pain. But do these stipulated facts allow us to conclude that fish cannot be conscious or feel pain? I do not think so, because fish might have evolved an altogether different set of neural circuits that is just as capable as the mammalian neocortex of generating consciousness. After all, the independent evolution of similar neural features and behavioral capacities is a well-known aspect of evolution. It is pretty clear, for example, that the capacity for complex cognition (e.g., tool manufacture and use) evolved independently in birds and mammals (see Striedter, 2013), even though the avian telencephalon is very different from its mammalian Animal Sentience 2016.021: Commentary on Key on Fish Pain 2 counterpart. (Birds do have a neocortex homolog, but most of it differs in numerous respects from the mammalian neocortex.) Hence we cannot conclude that birds are incapable of complex cognition just because they lack a typical mammalian neocortex. Similarly, we cannot conclude that fish are red-green color blind just because they lack one of the photosensitive pigments that primates need to make this discrimination; fish simply accomplish this task using a different set of molecules (e.g., Bowmaker, 1998). In short, the fact that different species can (and did) evolve different neural mechanisms to achieve similar behaviors makes me wary of concluding that fish cannot feel pain simply because they lack mammalian neocortex. Key goes on to make a more specific and interesting argument: He claims that having a neocortex is the only way to achieve consciousness, because only a neocortex can provide the kind of “signal amplification” and “global integration” that is needed for consciousness. This is a laudable attempt to specify the kinds of “computations” that might be capable

: Key (2016) claims fish that fish do not feel pain because they lack the necessary neuronal architecture: their responses to noxious stimuli, according to Key, are executed automatically without any feelings. However, as pointed out by many of his commentators, this conclusion is not convincing. Plants might provide some clues. Plants are not usually thought to be very active behaviorally, but the evidence suggests otherwise. Moreover, in stressful situations, plants produce numerous chemicals that have painkilling and anesthetic properties. Finally, plants, when treated with anesthetics, cannot execute active behaviors such as touch-induced leaf movements or rapid trap closures after localizing animal prey.

" Key on Fish Pain " by Victoria A. Braithwaite and Paula Droege --> Skip to main content Home About FAQ My Account Home > ASent > 2016 > No. 3 Citation Braithwaite, Victoria A. and Droege, Paula (2016) Why human pain can’t tell us whether fish feel pain . Animal Sentience 3(3) Author Website http://bio.psu.edu/directory/vab12 Commentary Type Invited Commentary Thread Brian Key, Why fish do not feel pain Abstract In his target article, Key (2016) reviews the neuroanatomy of human pain and uses what is known about human pain to argue that fish cannot experience pain. We provide three reasons why the conclusions reached by Key are unsupported. They consider (i) why it is not sufficient to conclude that only human neural structures can process conscious pain, (ii) why an understanding of pain in humans and non-human animals needs to be based within a framework of consciousness, and (iii) evidence already exists that fish treated with noxious stimuli lose the ability to perform normal behaviours: This was a behavioral proxy that Key proposed would provide good evidence for an animal to feel pain. Author Biography Victoria Braithwaite v.braithwaite@psu.edu is Professor of Fisheries and Biology at Penn State University. Her research focuses on animal cognition. She studies neurophysiology and behaviour to determine the mechanistic processes that influence animal behavior. She has researched and written about whether fish have the capacity for pain perception. http://bio.psu.edu/directory/vab12 Paula Droege pdroege@psu.edu is Senior Lecturer in the Philosophy Department at Penn State University. Her theories of consciousness propose an essential role for temporal representation in conscious states. She wrote Caging the Beast: A Theory of Sensory Consciousness and articles on the role of consciousness in memory, free will, and delusions.

"Why fish pain cannot and should not be ruled out" by Anil K. Seth --> Skip to main content Home About FAQ My Account Home > ASent > 2016 > No. 3 Citation Seth, Anil K. (2016) Why fish pain cannot and should not be ruled out . Animal Sentience 3(14) Author Website www.anilseth.com Commentary Type Invited Commentary Thread Brian Key, Why fish do not feel pain Abstract Do fish consciously feel pain? Addressing this question, Key (2016) asks whether the neural mechanisms underlying conscious pain reports in humans can be identified in fish. This strategy fails in three ways. First, non-mammalian consciousness — if it exists — may depend on different mechanisms. Second, accumulating neurophysiological and behavioural evidence, evolutionary considerations, and emerging Bayesian brain theories suggest that if fish can feel at all, they can feel pain. Finally, the qualitative nature of pain and suffering obliges us, via the precautionary principle, to accommodate the possibility of its existence where doubt remains. Author Biography Anil K. Seth a.k.seth@sussex.ac.uk is Professor of Cognitive and Computational Neuroscience and Co-Director of the Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science at the University of Sussex.

the original on 26 August 2021. Retrieved 26 August 2021. "Do fish feel pain? Not as humans do, study suggests". ScienceDaily. 8 August 2013. Archived from Pescetarianism ( PESK-ə-TAIR-ee-ə-niz-əm; sometimes spelled pescatarianism) is a dietary practice in which seafood and fish is the only source of meat in a diet. Other animal products, such as eggs and dairy, may also be included. According to research conducted from 2017 to 2018, approximately 3% of adults worldwide are pescetarian. Pescetarianism may be perceived as a more ethical choice because fish and shellfish may not experience fear, pain, and suffering as more complex animals like mammals and other tetrapods do. As a counterargument, from a scientific viewpoint, there are functional areas in the brains of fish that can make them feel pain. Furthermore, fish have pain receptors similar to humans, and evidence shows that pain signals are sent from these receptors to the brain, enabling fish to feel pain. However, this is an ongoing debate. Some pescetarians may regard their diet as a transition to vegetarianism, while others may consider it an ethical compromise, often as a practical necessity to obtain nutrients that are absent, not easily found, or not readily bioavailable in plants.