In the philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and psychology, the causal relationship between phenomenal consciousness, mentation, and brain states has always been a matter of debate. On the one hand, material monism posits consciousness and mind as pure brain epiphenomena. One of its most stringent lines of reasoning relies on a 'loss-of-function lesion premise,' according to which, since brain lesions and neurochemical modifications lead to cognitive impairment and/or altered states of consciousness, there is no reason to doubt the mind-brain identity. On the other hand, dualism or idealism (in one form or another) regard consciousness and mind as something other than the sole product of cerebral activity pointing at the ineffable, undefinable, and seemingly unphysical nature of our subjective qualitative experiences and its related mental dimension. Here, several neuroscientific findings are reviewed that question the idea that posits phenomenal experience as an emergent property of brain activity, and argue that the premise of material monism is based on a logical correlation-causation fallacy. While these (mostly ignored) findings, if considered separately from each other, could, in principle, be recast into a physicalist paradigm, once viewed from an integral perspective, they substantiate equally well an ontology that posits mind and consciousness as a primal phenomenon. The conventional Cartesian dualism is no longer considered tenable but other forms of dualism, or theoretical frameworks of philosophical idealism, or more generally, non-physicalist ontologies, state that mind and consciousness cannot be explained as a mere result of neural processes. Dualism is opposed by an identity theory, which, instead, considers mind processes as identical to brain processes, and consciousness as nothing other than an emergent epiphenomenon arising from the collective interaction of the neuronal activity. Sentience, with all its subjective dimensions of experiences, feelings, and thoughts, is a physical process determined only by the laws of physics. Qualia–the subjective, phenomenal, and mental experiences we can access only introspectively, such as the perception of color, or that of pain and pleasure–are physical brain states, while any speculation concerning an immaterial mind or consciousness is considered an unnecessary hypothesis. Dualists and monists have different schools of thought but, despite the variety of opinions, it is fair to say that most scientists and philosophers consider themselves to be material monists. For example, according to a survey ( Bourget and Chalmers, 2020 ) 51.9% of philosophers declare themselves ‘physicalists’ vs. 32.1% as non-physicalists, and 15.9% as ‘other’. On the other hand, exceptional human experiences occur frequently in both the general population and in scientists and engineers ( Wahbeh et al., 2018 ). However, there is a growing awareness that a mere functional investigation will not answer questions of a more philosophical nature. The belief that the progress of modern neurosciences would soon shed light on David Chalmer’s notorious ‘hard problem of consciousness’ ( Chalmers, 1995 ) has turned out to be too optimistic. It turns out that cortex-like circuits in avian birds exist that are reminiscent of mammalian forebrains, and the idea that advanced cognitive skills are possible only because of the evolution of the highly complex cerebral cortex in mammals is becoming less plausible ( Stacho et al., 2020 ). Sufficiently strong evidence concludes that both cephalopods and crustaceans are sentient ( Cox et al., 2021 ). This is unsurprising: Common sense does not really need any scientific proof to accept that ravens, crows, octopuses, or lobsters are sentient beings. All these findings require an explanation from the physicalist viewpoint, which identifies the mind and consciousness with the brain. These findings were later confirmed by further studies with other hallucinogenic drugs such as LSD and ayahuasca ( Palhano-Fontes et al., 2015 ; Carhart-Harris et al., 2016 ; Lewis, 2017 ). For a more detailed analysis of this rationale see ( Kastrup, 2016 ). Kastrup also notes how several brain function impairments are accompanied by richer and more intense subjective experiences of self-transcendence (e.g., near-death-experiences associated with dramatically reduced brain function; Kastrup, 2017 ). Motivated by this assumption we asked whether the idea of a specific brain area, structure, or its related activity, as being responsible for the qualitative and subjective experiences is consistent with the evidence, and pointed out the lack of conclusive evidence that the phenomenal dimension and singularity of the sense of self-hood, together with its higher cognitive functions is disrupted despite large impairments, suggesting that the hypothesis of a (local or global) brain-based ‘seat of consciousness’, if not inconsistent, must be too simplistic. A non-physicalist standpoint that sees mind and consciousness not as an epiphenomenon of matter but, rather, fundamental primitives that manifest through the material substrate (e.g., by what James called a ‘transmissive’ rather than ‘generating’ function) in line with a dualistic, idealistic, or other post-material worldviews. A possible future generalist approach, that does not necessarily impose one or another metaphysical worldview but starts with the assumption of a ‘post-material psychology’, could be a line of research ( Beauregard et al., 2018 ). The mind–body problem and the hard problem of consciousness remain controversial issues more than ever, but non-physical ontologies of mind and consciousness are far from having been expunged by science. We have the right to explore these as a viable option not despite but, to the contrary, because of neuroscientific evidence that has been selectively dismissed for too long but cannot be ignored forever–if we can connect the dots.