Equilibria in signaling games can be refined to select the sender-optimal outcome using the intuitive criterion.
the verdict
INSUFFICIENT LEANING
refutedsupported
the weight of evidence
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Peer-reviewed literature discusses equilibrium refinements such as the intuitive criterion in signaling games, but does not provide complete evidence that equilibria are refined specifically to select the sender-optimal outcome.
A global signaling game is a sender-receiver game in which the sender is only imperfectly informed about the receiver's preferences. The paper considers an economically relevant class of signaling games that possess more than one Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. For this class of games, it is shown that a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is unaffected by a small perturbation of the information structure if and only if it is consistent with a criterion suggested by Cho and Kreps (1987). Moreover, the equilibrium in the global signaling game is essentially unique.
This paper investigates the refinements of Nash equilibrium in two person signaling game experiments. The experimental games cover the watershed of the nested refinements: Bayes-Nash, Sequential, Intuitive, Divine, Universally Divine, NWBR, and Stabel. In each game an equilibrium selection problem is defined in which adjacent refinements are considered. The pattern of outcomes suggest that individuals select the more refined equilibria up to the divinity concept. However, an anomaly occurs in the game in which the stable equilibrium is a clear preference among the subjects. Since the concepts are nested this suggests that the outcomes are game specific. Sender behavior does not seem to follow any specific decision rule (e.g., Nash, minmax, PIR, etc.) while receiver actions tend to correspond to the Nash equilibrium outcomes.
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